Democracies are under threat everywhere, with autocratic leaders leading the charge to erode cherished freedoms, undermine faith in elections, and diminish institutions meant to counter unchecked power. Among those institutions are our administrative agencies—our technocratic governing apparatus where public interest meets public reason—believed to be a “benevolent constraining force” that can counter an autocrat by resisting illiberal policies. This Note explores this characteristic of agencies, specifically in the context of their rulemaking power. We look at both historical experiences and the administrative law landscape in the Philippines to link agency action with democratic backsliding. It then draws from existing scholarship to develop a legal analysis model that integrates both the bureaucracy’s authority and incentive to exhibit resistance towards an autocrat. The analysis culminates in a typology of agencies that provides an explanation for bureaucratic behavior. Ultimately, the discussion builds on the legal discourse surrounding administrative agencies and their important role in the protection of our democracy.