This paper aims to review the fulfillment of duty doctrine in police killings of fleeing offenders, and critique it using constitutional and international human rights standards and principles. It is argued here that the doctrine is a colonial legacy, which emerged when police abuses were unquestioned and human rights standards were not yet clearly established. The jurisprudential development of the fulfillment of duty doctrine was conceptual in nature, focusing on what the doctrine means. One major turn of the doctrine was its departure from Spanish jurisprudence with the introduction of the Oanis two-requisite rule, which was imposed without legal basis. Such conceptual development also failed to provide a human rights-based standard upon which the use of force on fleeing offenders is evaluated. Moreover, it is likewise argued that the application of the doctrine in non-dangerous fleeing suspects cases runs against the constitutional reasonableness standard on the use of force. The doctrine’s justification of the killing of non-dangerous fleeing prisoners and even retreating attackers also violates international human rights standards and principles. Most importantly, the requisites of necessity and proportionality––the twin pillars of police use of force—are absent in these cases. Additionally, the application of the doctrine violates the principle of non-discrimination among different types of suspects. These conclusions imply the need to abandon the said applications of the doctrine in police pursuit killings and move towards a rights-centric approach to police use of force evaluations.