Post-Knutson Navigation: Analyzing Philippine Laws on Child Protection in Light of the Application Crisis in Knutson v. Sarmiento-Flores

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines provides the time-honored principle and duty that the State shall defend the right of children and protect them from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. Aside from the Constitution, the Philippines enacted several laws that reflect this principle including Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 7610 or the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act” which is at the forefront of penalizing various forms of abuse against children. According to the Supreme Court, R.A. No. 7610 is a piece of legislation that is enacted to supply the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the “Child and Youth Welfare Code.”

Aside from such laws, the Philippines is equipped with a handful of laws and rules that touch on various aspects of child protection and abuse such as R.A. No. 9208 on anti-trafficking of persons, R.A. No. 9321 on child labor, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC or the “Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors,” R.A. No. 9262 on violence against women and their children (“VAWC”), R.A. No. 9344 on juvenile justice and welfare, R.A. No. 9775 on anti-child pornography, R.A. No. 11642 on adoption, and R.A. No. 11648 on anti-rape, sexual exploitation, and abuse. However, in the landmark case of Knutson v. Sarmiento-Flores, the Supreme Court effectively removed the barrier that distinguishes R.A. No. 7610 on child abuse from R.A. No. 9262 on violence against women and their children. Contrary to the legislative intent behind R.A. No. 9262 or the “Anti-VAWC Act,” the Supreme Court held that a father may apply for a protection order under the Anti-VAWC Act on behalf of his child against the latter’s mother. This pronouncement goes against the very nature of the Anti-VAWC Act as gender-based legislation. This paper presents a critique of the Court’s holding and ratio in Knutson v. Sarmiento-Flores, and offers a detailed harmonization of the existing laws and jurisprudence on child protection that may become useful in reconsidering the doctrine espoused by the said case in order (1) to remove the confusion created with regard to the applicability of our laws on child protection and abuse; and (2) to preserve the character of R.A. No. 9262 as gender-based legislation.