THE PHILIPPINES: FROM COMMUNAL TO SOCIETAL PANGULO REGIME*

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This paper attempts to interpret Philippine politics by examining its changes and continuity from the pre-Spanish times to the present and by prescribing a kind of regime for the 1980's and beyond. Its thesis is composed of two parts — an empirically based argument and a normative one. The empirical part argues that the Philippine political system evolved from a communal *pangulo* regime to a societal pangulo regime. The normative portion is a corollary to the empirical. This may be put briefly as follows: The great danger of a societal pangulo regime being dictatorship, this thing should be banished from the polity; or if this is impossible, then at least it should be caged or chained. One way to banish this danger is to dissolve its attributes; this paper argues that the Filipino cultural value of *pagdamay,* or sharing with and caring for others, which is an integral part of a pangulo regime, will do the work. However, since pagdamay is only an ideal, a practical means should be relied upon in coping with dictatorship. The practical means to chain or cage this danger is the countervailing power of liberal democracy. If liberal democracy is blended with the pangulo principle, the resulting synthesis is a Filipino liberal democracy.

There are three principal concepts on which this paper is based — first, the idea of pangulo regime (communal and societal), which is presented in Sections II, III, and IV; second, that of pagdamay, which is taken up in Section V; and third, the concept of Filipino liberal democracy, which is discussed in Sections VI and VII. Sections I and VIII are the introduction and conclusion, respectively, of the paper.

I

After World War II, Western colonies in Asia and Africa won their independence and became members of the fast-growing family of nations. In Asia, the Philippines was the first new nation to win independence, which took place in 1946. In Africa, Ghana was the first black new country to get established as a new state, and this happened a decade later, in 1957. Eventually, since the 1940's and 1950's practically all the colonies in Asia and Africa under the domination of Western imperialist states have

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become independent and attained membership in the United Nations. This fact is reflected in the tremendous rise in the membership of the United Nations since the end of World War II. In 1946, the members of the world organization were only 51; in 1979, the membership had risen to 150.

The emancipation of Asian and African peoples and their becoming members of the United Nations are indeed important developments in the Third World, but equally significant is the political change which has taken place in the nature of the regimes of the new states. During the first few years since their independence, these new nations adopted Western models of political systems, usually those which existed in the mother country. For example, the Philippines, a former colony of the United States, adopted the American model of presidential system of government; and Ghana, a former ward of the United Kingdom, adopted the English model of parliamentary democracy. These adopted foreign models, at first, proved to be quite vigorous and healthy systems. Owing to their initial success, eminent political scientists were optimistic of the prospects of Western democracies in Asia and Africa. However, as the years went by, the Western transplants in Asia and Africa began to become sickly, and most of them died. The sickly which have survived are presently in grave danger of succumbing to death unless the proper remedy should be administered.

In Asia and Africa, the dismal prospects of political systems based on foreign models became obvious by 1958, which Emerson called "the year of the great collapse". This author elaborated:

> Within a few weeks of each other, Pakistan, Burma, and the Sudan surrendered their civilian governments into the hands of the military who in varying degree abrogated constitutions, postponed elections, and abolished or sidetracked political parties. In the Middle East, where Egypt and Syria had already made the transition, the revolution in Iraq installed a general in power, setting in motion the abortive American and British military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan, and Lebanon elected the Chief of its army to the presidency. Ceylon was having its considerable troubles, and Indonesia, plagued by revolution and political feuding, retained only remnants of parliamentary rule under the watchful eye of the military. In Ghana, Nkrumah and his associates ruled with a strong hand, cavalierly over-riding the usual rights of the opposition.[1]

In the case of Ghana, the death throes of parliamentary democracy did not take place until 1961, when the English model of parliamentary system was transformed into a regime ruled by what Apter called "a presidential-monarch, increasingly backed by force."[2] The series of events which led to this state of affairs had been summarized by Apter as follows:

> Constitutional monarchy was changed to republicanism in a constitution which provided exceptional autonomy on the part of the first President, i.e., Nkrumah.

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[1] EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION 276-277 (1962).
[2] APTER, GHANA IN TRANSITION 336 (1972).

> A series of bills, enacted to assist the government in dealing with opposition and subversive elements, eliminated many of the legal safeguards customary to Western legal practice, including special courts for treason and the suspension of *habeas corpus* for political crimes, whether committed or anticipated.
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> The unity of state, party, and president more and more became the order of the day, culminating in parliamentary resolutions in favor of making Nkrumah the Life President of Ghana and to recognize Ghana officially as a single-party state.[3]

The death of Ghana's parliamentary regime, however, did not take place until 1966, when the extremely emasculated parliamentary system that persisted under Nkrumah was finally dealt a fatal blow by the military which staged a *coup d' etat* while Nkrumah was on a state visit in Peking, the People's Republic of China.

The transplanted presidential model in the Philippines, however, had an amazingly long and viable existence. As late as 1971, Emerson had observed that the Philippines was one of the five countries of the Third World which still maintained a working Western democracy.[4] Actually, however, by that year, the American presidential democratic system was already expiring. The constitutional convention, which was then currently deliberating on a new constitution for the republic, was already on the verge of adopting a parliamentary model to replace the presidential regime. By October, 1972, the constitutional convention in fact approved the adoption of a parliamentary system, thus officially putting to death the presidential system which had been introduced in the Philippines by the United States through McKinley's Instructions in 1900.

Why did the Western models of political systems fail in Asia and Africa?

There are a number of reasons, such as the underdeveloped economy of the countries of these areas; the extremely low education attained by their peoples; the various crises confronting their governments — crisis of identity, crisis of participation, crisis of distribution, and crisis of government; and the like. But one of the most important reasons is the cultural, for this factor is intimately and directly related to political leadership and organization, which, in crises-ridden and resource-poor countries of the Third World, are the independent variables of successful governance and political development.

The crucial role of the cultural factor in the failure of Western political models in Asia and Africa had been recognized by Asian and African political leaders and social scientists.

Sukarno of Indonesia stated in 1957:

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[3] *Id.*, at 337.

[4] Emerson, *The Prospects for Democracy in Africa*, in LOFCHIE, ED., THE STATE OF THE NATIONS: CONSTRAINTS ON DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 256 (1971).

> I have finally come to the conclusion that the cause (of political instability) lies in our practicing a system not suited to our specific requirements, in our indiscriminate adoption of every feature of the system that is known as western democracy.[5]

Ola, an African social scientist, has made a comparative study of the reason behind what he termed "the crisis of parliamentary democracy in Africa". To Ola, the basis of the crisis is cultural. He said:

> While the parliamentary structure of authority is the product of the industrial culture of the West, it is being made the beginning and generator of industrialization in Black Africa. Parliamentary democracy has been manufactured and artificially grafted unto African culture. In effect, little or no rational attempt has been made to discover and design that political system which is at once harmonious with the ethos of an agrarian civilization and capable of transforming it. The perceived structural dissonance with African culture has therefore conditioned the rejection of Western parliamentary democracy by significant sections of the ruling elites. The revolt identified parliamentary democracy with "industria" and condemns it for "agraria" because the parliamentary system does not reflect its new and primitive environment.[6]

Considering the discussion in this section and the need for a viable political order in the Philippines, which also experienced a crisis of government as the other countries of the Third World, we must, therefore, embark on a voyage of rediscovery of Filipino cultural values in order to use them as life-giving force to sustain a viable political regime in the Philippines. In making this academic journey, we must sail beyond the western models, whether presidential or parliamentary, for these are the alien shores where most of the Asian and African new nations had been plunged into revolution, military rule, or martial law; or had been entrapped in social turmoil, economic underdevelopment, and political instability.

II

The ideal place to visit in order to find the roots of the Filipino culture is the pre-Spanish *barangay*. It is ideal because the ancient barangay was not westernized, whether Hispanized or Americanized. The values of the barangay, therefore, in this sense, are indigenous.

What do we find in the barangay in pre-Spanish times?

The barangay was a kin-based community, usually located by the mouth of or along a river, or by the sea. Such riverine or sea-side location is natural, for the families which constituted the barangay were brought to this place by boat, also called a barangay. All over the archipelago, there were hundreds of barangays. Each of these communities was autono-

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[5] BRECHER, *Political Instability in the New States of Asia*, in ECKSTEIN & APTER, eds., COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A READER 620 (1963).

[6] OPEYEMI OLA, *The Cultural Basis of the Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy in Africa*, CIVILIZATIONS, 22, 594 (1972).

mous and independent; i.e., it was not under the control of an external power. In this sense, the barangay may be called a village-state, analogous to the ancient city-states in Greece during the fifth century B.C.

The barangay as a social system was composed of three social strata — the *maharlika* or the nobility, the *timawa* or the freemen, and the *alipin* or servile class, of the Tagalogs. The latter stratum was subdivided into two sub-strata — the *aliping namamahay,* servile persons who owned their households and worked for either the maharlika or the timawa; and the *aliping sagigilid,* servile persons who worked inside the house of a maharlika or timawa. The barangay of the Pampangos, Ilocanos, Visayans, Tausogs, and other ethnic groups of the archipelago was composed essentially of the same kinds of strata, although the terms, naturally are different. The barangay, therefore, was a hierarchical social system.

As a political system, the barangay was led by a *dato* or chief, who exercised legislative, executive, judicial, and military powers. There was also a Council of Elders, composed of senior members of the maharlika, who advised the dato. The dato himself came from the maharlika. The laws of the barangay administered by the dato were based on customs and traditions.

The politics of the barangay was uncomplicated, which was mainly a politics of paternalism and incorporation. Every person born in the barangay was incorporated to become an organic part of the barangay through socialization in the customs, traditions, and practices of the barangay. Persons who came from other barangays, either by capture in war, voluntary joining through marriage, abduction, or some other means were also incorporated in the barangay through regular socialization. Rebels were exiled or put to death. Cooperation with one another and deference or obedience to the dato was voluntary and spontaneous. The dato provided leadership and security in the barangay. Loarca, for instance, said:

> The Chief is under obligation to defend the *timawa,* in his person and those of his relatives, against anyone who seeks to injure him without cause; and thus, it happens that, to defend the *timawa,* fathers fight against their sons, and brothers against one another. If the *timawa* goes to another village and there is wronged, the chief will endeavor, with all his forces to avenge him to the same extent. Thus, the *timawa* lives in security.[7]

The basic cultural value of the barangay was organic hierarchy, which posits that the barangay is a body with a head and prescribes that *"Ang sakit ng kalingkingan ay damdam ng buong katawan."* (The pain suffered by the little finger is suffered by the whole body). This folk saying is

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[7] Miguel Loarca was a Spanish soldier and *encomendero* of Panay. His 1582 account of the Philippines is titled *Relacion de las Yslas Filipinas.* The Spanish account and its English translation are in 5 BLAIR & ROBERTSON, ED., THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 1493-1803, 34-187 (1903-109). The quotation is on p. 149.

For details on the pre-Spanish barangay, see P. FERNANDEZ, CUSTOM LAW IN PRE-CONQUEST PHILIPPINES, Chapters 4 and 5, pp. 43-73 (1976).

Tagalog; its Ilocano equivalent is: *"Uray la ti kikit ti magaradgadan, isu amin ti bagi ti masakitan."* ("Even if it is only the little finger that is hurt, the entire body is hurt.")

If the barangay as a regime were given a name, the appropriate term is a *pangulo regime,* which is an organic and hierarchical system. It is a *pangulo* regime, for it is led by a chief who served as head, the literal meaning of pangulo (from *pang,* one which is used for; and *ulo,* head). The pangulo is a dominant executive, for, he, like the head, is on top in relation to the other parts of the barangay; and, like the head, he has the five senses of perception and the brain. It is organic, because the barangay is perceived to be a body, composed of several and interdependent parts. It is hierarchical because the parts of the barangay are composed of minor and major parts, with a head which is the major part.

The pangulo regime includes as an integral part of the system the value of organic hierarchy, which prescribed that the pain suffered by the humblest member was suffered by the entire barangay. This value may be regarded as the heart and soul of the barangay. It is a value which involves sharing, caring, or loving, for the folk saying in effect says that if one part of the community suffers all the other parts also suffer. Therefore, everyone must share with, care for, or love the others, for by acting this way, he is helping himself. Owing to the value of organic hierarchy, the pangulo regime is not a mere system; it is transformed into a moral community.

Since this pangulo regime existed only in a small, homogeneous, and self-sufficient community, it is properly a *communal* pangulo regime. The adjective communal here is derived from Tonnies' concept of community or *gemeinschaft* in his work *Gemeinschaft und Gessellschaft* (Community and Society). Characterizing a *gemeinschaft,* Tonnies said:

> Reciprocal, binding sentiment as a peculiar will of a Gemeinschaft we shall call understanding (consensus). It represents the special force and sympathy which keeps human beings together as members of a totality. ... Understanding is based upon intimate knowledge of each other insofar as this is conditioned and advanced by direct interest of one being in the life of the other, and readiness to take part in his joy and sorrow.
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> The real organ of understanding, through which it develops and improves, is language ... by means of gestures and sounds ...
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> The real foundation of unity, and consequently the possibility of Gemeinschaft, in the first place is closeness of blood relationship and mixture of blood; secondly, physical proximity; and finally, for human beings, intellectual proximity. In this gradation, therefore, are to be found the sources of all kinds of understanding.
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> We may now establish the great main laws of Gemeinschaft: 1) Relatives and married couples love each other or easily adjust themselves to each other ... Likewise do neighbors and other friends. 2) There is

[8] TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (1963).

> understanding between people who love each other. 3) Those who love and understand each other remain and dwell together and organize their common life.[9]

III

The pre-Spanish barangay existed more than four hundred years ago. Since that time, the Philippine polity has changed from one regime to another, as the Spanish *conquistadores,* Filipino revolutionists, American colonial administrators, and Filipino political elite imposed their cultural values and legal writs on the Filipino polity. The issue may be raised, therefore, whether the pangulo regime of the pre-Spanish barangay is still applicable to the country today, considering that four centuries or several generations have pushed the barangay to ancient times and perhaps its utility into oblivion; and that the barangay has been transformed from a small and homogeneous community to a vast and heterogeneous society.

This important question will be answered in Section IV of this paper. In the meantime, it is necessary to discuss the evolution of the Philippine polity from the Spanish regime to the present in order to link the pre-Spanish barangay, which we have visited, to the present and future Filipino polity, which will be our major concern. At the same time, an overview of this evolution can reveal the changes and continuity during these four centuries.

In discussing the changes which occurred and the continuity which persisted in the Philippines during these four hundred years, we shall also be shedding significant light on some aspects of the sub-theme which was assigned to me — the evolving political institutions of the country. The further exposition of this topic, of course, will be continued in the subsequent sections, bringing it to the present situation and the future possibilities of the Philippines.

During the Spanish regime from 1571 to 1898, the numerous and fragmented barangays of the archipelago had been more or less centralized under a single political system with Manila as capital. Eventually called Filipinas or Philippines, the over-all executive of this enlarged political system was the Governor-General.

At the end of the Spanish regime in 1898, the roles of the Governor-General definitely showed him to be occupying a predominant position in the polity. The *Guia Official* of that year observed:

> (He) is the sole and legitimate representative of the Supreme Power of the Government of the King of Spain in Filipinas, and as such is the Supreme Chief of all offices of public administration. In this capacity he has the power of supreme inspection over said offices, not excluding the tribunals of justice.

[9] *Id.* at 47-48.

> This elevated office. which is filled by a lieutenant-general of the National Armies, is vested with extraordinary and the most important attributes... Annexed to this office are those of Vice-Royal Patron of the Indias, Captain-General-in-Chief of the Army of Filipinas, Inspector General of troops and institutions, Supreme Chief of the Naval Forces, and President of all Corporations and Associations of an official character.[10]

In earlier times, the Governor-General was also President of the Royal Audiencia, a national body similar to the present Supreme Court.[11]

During the Philippine Revolution, especially during its second phase, from 1898 to 1901, the constitution of the republic that was established did not provide for a strong executive. Instead, a very powerful Assembly of Representatives was created. As Calderon, the principal author of the Constitution, said: "In a word, it may be affirmed that the congress of the republic was the omnipotent power of the entire nation."[12]

However, it is a fact that the constitution of the Philippine Revolution was short-lived. In any case, General Emilio Aguinaldo, who assumed the role of Dictator on June 18, 1898 and later as President of the Revolutionary Congress at Malolos, continued playing the role of a dominant President and Military Chief until his capture on March 23, 1901.

Under the American regime, the national executive at first was the Military Governor (from 1898 to 1901) and later the Governor-General (from 1902 to 1935). Being the top official of the colonial and imperial power, the executive, whether military or civilian, was a dominant leader. With the establishment of the Philippine Assembly in 1907 and the Philippine Legislature in 1916, the American executive shared power with Filipino lawmakers. However, the balance of power was tilted on the side of the Governor-General. If fundamental matters were involved, authorities in Washington invariably supported the Governors-General whenever they clashed with Filipino legislators. Since they were elected neither by the Filipino electorate nor by the Filipino lawmakers, the American Governors-General could insist on their policies without losing their positions.

During the Commonwealth era, from 1935 to 1946, the superficial legal appearance showed that the executive had become no longer dominant. As in the preceding period of the American regime after civil government was established, from 1902 to 1935, the form of government was presidential, with the three great branches of government being coordinate with and separate from one another. In this sense, from the legal viewpoint it could be said that the executive exercised only one-third of the total power of the government.

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[10] SECRETARIA DEL GOVIERNO GENERAL, GUIA OFFICIAL DE LAS ISLAS FILIPINAS, 1808, 263-264 1898, cited in CORPUZ, THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE PHILIPPINES 46-47 (1957).

[11] BATACAN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE PHILIPPINE HISTORY 62-64 (1972).

[12] Felipe G. Calderon, *My Memoirs of the Philippine Revolution*, in 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILIPPINES 215 (1957).

The political reality, however, was that the Philippine executive became more dominant during the Commonwealth regime. What happened was that the American model of presidential government was discarded by Manuel L. Quezon, the Filipino Pangulo of the period. Instead, Quezon transformed the presidential system into a pangulo regime, a system of government where, among others, the executive is superordinate to the legislature. Quezon did not exercise only the traditional roles of the President under a presidential regime, such as those of Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Administrator, Chief of Foreign Relations and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces but also those of Party Chief, Chief Legislator and Chief of the Nation. Professor Hayden, who was also Vice Governor-General of the Philippines before the Commonwealth period, said that when Quezon submitted his initial program during the beginning of the Commonwealth era, he "set up an office in the Legislative Palace and went there personally to see his bills through."[13] Professor Gabriel F. Fabella, former head of the Department of History of the University of the Philippines and member of the Commonwealth National Assembly, stated that ninety-five percent of the laws enacted by the National Assembly, came from Malacañang Palace.[14] Jose E. Romero, who was an official of the same Commonwealth National Assembly, characterized Quezon as follows: "President Quezon has become the central figure in the constellation of contemporary statesmen around which the other stars revolve and from whom they borrow their lights."[15]

During the period of the Independent Republic, from 1946 to the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972, Presidents followed Quezon's example; i.e., they asserted their dominant position in the political system. However, the success of these Presidents varied from one chief executive to another. Their success in making themselves the dominant leader of the polity depended on their personality, the assertiveness of the Congress and the Supreme Court, the balance of power of the competing political parties, American intervention in Philippine domestic politics, and other factors. While some Presidents were more successful in becoming a dominant executive than the others, depending upon the impact of the above-named factors, the general pattern was the same — all the Presidents tended to dominate the Philippine political system.

During the Martial Law regime, from September 21, 1972 to January 17, 1981, the President of the Philippines definitely had been established as a pangulo executive under a pangulo regime. The executive in the person of Pangulo Ferdinand E. Marcos, exercised the following roles: Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief Administrator, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief of Foreign Relations, Party Chief, Martial Law

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[13] HAYDEN, THE PHILIPPINES: A STUDY IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 68 (1955).
[14] *Myth After Quezon*, X HISTORICAL BULLETIN 107 (1966).
[15] NOT SO LONG AGO: CHRONICLE OF MY LIFE, TIMES AND CONTEMPORARIES 127 (1979).

Chief, Chief Legislator (from Sept. 21, 1972 to June 11, 1978, as Sole Legislator), and Chief Exponent of the Ideology of the New Society. These roles were exercised in accordance with the authority of the three offices which he held — President under the 1935 Constitution, President under the 1973 Constitution, and Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution.[16]

After the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981, the Pangulo remains the dominant chief and leader of the nation and the polity. This is the case because, although as Pangulo Marcos stated before the Batasang Pambansa, during the resumption of the recessed Third Session of the Batasan on January 19, 1981, that he was formally effecting "the transfer of legislative power from the President exercising martial powers to... the members of the Batasang Pambansa"[17] as of that date, the Pangulo also observed that he was mandated by Amendment No. 6 of the series of amendments of 1976 to exercise legislative power by issuing decrees or similar measures "whenever in the judgment of the President there exists a grave emergency or threat of imminence thereof or whenever the (interim) Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action..."[18] Moreover, the proclamation lifting martial law explicitly provides that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President constitute part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President; or expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."[19]

In this summary review of the evolution of the Philippine polity during the past four hundred years, what pattern of governance has remained constant in spite of the changes that had occurred? It is obvious from the facts that the pattern which has continued throughout the centuries or different political periods is that of the dominant executive in the political system. This proposition is true, even if we exclude from this generalization the regimes when Spanish and American colonial rulers governed the Philippines, on the ground that those governing elites must be dominant because colonial rule, to be effective and successful, require dominant executive elites. Aguinaldo, Quezon, and all other Presidents tended to be dominant executives in the Philippine political system, although some of them were more dominant than others. In the case of President Ferdinand

[16] For details, see Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Philippine Executive*, Chapter 6 in a forthcoming book on Philippine Politics and Government, edited by Raul P. de Guzman, Dean of the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

[17] Marcos, "Report to The Nation: A New Age," Address of the President, Opening Session of the Batasang Pambansa, 19 January 1981, Manila, p. 2.

[18] *Id.* at 3.

[19] Proclamation No. 2045, January 17, 1981.

E. Marcos, especially under the martial law regime, definitely there is no fact that can be brought out to invalidate this statement.

Why this pattern of dominant executive?

The answer to this is cultural: Filipinos have been socialized to believe, perceive, or conceive that the society and the polity are bodies.

In the Philippines, the great agencies of socialization are the family, the school, the church, the mass media, and the government. Of these agencies the most important and pervasive is the family.

The government cannot be as important and pervasive as the family because, except for the government employees and officials who are continually being socialized in the goals, programs, and doctrines of the government in their daily or regular work in the public service, the people's interactions or transactions with the government are occasional, sporadic, or intermittent. The mass media cannot be as important and pervasive as the family because the mass media are heavily concentrated only in urban areas; and the urban population of the country constitutes only about thirty per cent of the total population. In any case, except for radio, all the mass media are limited in distribution.

The church, likewise, cannot be as important and pervasive as the family because most Filipinos are nominal Christians or Muslims. These two religious aggregates constitute about 97% of the total population, with the Christians constituting about 93%. The school also cannot be as important as the family because most Filipinos drop out from the schools before graduation from the elementary grades.

With regard to the family, however, this institution is all-pervasive. An extended and bilateral group, the Filipino family socializes its members from the cradle to the grave. Through language, rites of passage, ordinary activities, such as working or playing, and other aspects of community life, the Filipino's personality, patterns of behavior, values, and the like are developed or significantly influenced by the family. For it is in the extended family where he is born, grows up, interacts with relatives continuously and intimately, and dies.

Regardless of ethnic basis, whether Ilocano, Tagalog, Cebuano, Maranao, or otherwise, all Filipino languages are influential in the formation of perceptions, conceptions, or beliefs that the society and the polity are bodies because these languages structure the society and the polity as bodies. They do this because the terms used for various elements of the family, the basic unit of society and the polity, are about or related to the body.

The Ilocano language is the most explicit on this point. For instance, the term for relative in Ilocano is *kabagian,* whose root word *bagi* means body. A kabagian or relative, therefore, is a part of a body. The term for

brother or sister is *kabagis,* and its root word is *bagis,* which means intestine. The descendants or grandchildren are *apo iti tumeng, apo iti bukong-bukong,* and *apo iti dapan,* which mean literally grandchild of the knee, of the sole of the foot, and of the flat part of the foot. With all these organic terms, it is clear that the Ilocano extended family is one single body. This idea is effectively communicated to all members of the family because the method of language in putting across its message, like that of modern propaganda, is to direct it to the subliminal fields of perception of the receiver of the message. This idea is further instilled in the members of the extended family by reminding them with regard to their family obligations by means of the folk saying: *"Uray la ti kikit ti magaradgadan, isu amin ti bagi ti masakitan."* ("Even if it is only the small finger that is hurt, the entire body is hurt.")[20]

Other Filipino languages may not be as explicit as Ilocano, but fuller analysis of the languages shows that they, too, structure the family as a body. Tagalog is a representative example. In this language, brother or sister is *kapatid* or *kaputol,* whose root word *patid* or *putol* means part. But what is it a part of? Of a rope? Of a river? Of a body? However, if one knows that the grandchildren are *apo sa tuhod, apo sa sakong,* and *apo sa talampakan,* which mean as the corresponding Ilocano terms do, then one knows that the kapatid is a part of a body, and that all the relatives are parts of the same body.

Since the family is the basic unit of Philippine society and the polity, it is now clear why the society and the polity are also perceived as bodies. Thus, the polity or its sub-units, such as a city, a province, a municipality, or a barangay, have their respective *pangulo* (one who serves as head), *kinatawan* (one who embodies), *kanang kamay* (right hand) *bisig* (arm) and *mga galamay* (fingers). The pangulo and kinatawan are leaders, the kanang kamay and the bisig are subleaders, and the mga galamay are ordinary government personnel.

A Filipino who lives to reach the age of sixty — the average life span of a Filipino in 1980 was sixty-two years — cannot help but be socialized in the belief or perception of the society or the polity as a body because day in day out, week in week out, year in year out throughout these sixty years, language structures his thought to conceive that the society and polity are bodies. His perception of the society and the polity as bodies is reinforced by the precept which is brought to his attention whenever the occasion requires it: "Ang sakit ng kalingkingan, ay damdam ng buong katawan." In case this precept fails to register in the mind of the person being advised, he will be called names ranging from a milder epithet *walang utang na loob* (ungrateful) to the worst, *walang hiya* (shameless).

The Filipino is not only socialized to believe or perceive that the society or the polity is a body through language but also through various

[20] AGPALO, THE ORGANIC-HIERARCHICAL PARADIGM AND POLITICS IN THE PHILIPPINES, Professorial Chair Lecture Series, Monograph No. 1, pp. 2-3 (1973).

rites of passage — those performed during baptism, graduation, wedding, and a death in a family.

The most important of these rites are those in connection with a death in the family. Since a Filipino is a member of an extended family, before he dies himself, he will have attended several wakes for dead relatives — first cousins, second cousins, third cousins, a brother or sister, a nephew or niece, and aunts or uncles from the first to the fourth degree of consanguinity.

When death occurs in a family, an attempt to inform all relatives of the family will be made, which is done by word of mouth, letter, telegram, announcement in a newspaper, radio, and the like. Relatives from near and far, or from the town and the farm arrive to attend the rites. The little children are present, too; and they are taken care of by older children. Women cook, serve refreshments, or make wreaths; men make the coffin, construct the tomb, or prepare the burial ground; relatives bring food, silverware, chinaware, candles, and the like. Relatives are introduced to others they have not seen or visited for ages. In the lamentations, known as *panambitan* in Tagalog and *dung-aw* in Ilocano, the life of the dead is narrated, relating him to certain events significant to the family. The members of the family eat together, pray together, play parlor or card games together, go to the church and the cemetery together.

Among rural Ilocanos, there is also a bathing rite a few days after the funeral. The entire extended family, including the children and the old people, go together to a river to bathe, where each person is given a *golgol* or shampoo of lye made from the ashes of rice straw. This rite definitely is not a Christian practice; it is apparently pre-Christian in origin. Anthropologically, it must be interpreted as a cleansing rite.

The solidarity of the family as a body is celebrated in all the rites concerning the dead. Considering that all these are performed by all the members of the family together for at least nine days, since the *katapusan* (the end) of the rites is celebrated on the ninth day, one may conclude that attendance in a few wakes would be more than sufficient to socialize a Filipino in the idea that the basic unit of society and the polity — the family — is a body.

If the society and the polity are bodies, then the logical conclusion to draw is that they must have heads or agencies which serve as heads. This conclusion was actually made by Emilio Jacinto, the brains of the Katipunan, the organization which started the Philippine Revolution in 1896. Jacinto wrote:

> ... (I)n any society or association, there is a need for one that serves as head, one authority which is superordinate to all who will provide good order, maintain true unity, and help in the attainment of goals as a boat needs a skillful pilot, the lack of whom wil lead to the danger

> of getting lost and foundering at sea, thus losing all hopes of reaching its destination.
>
> The agency which serves as head is called the government and those who will exercise its authority are called Chiefs of the People.[21]

The perception of the society and the polity as bodies which develops through the pervasive influence of language on the subliminal fields of perception of the Filipino and is reinforced by folk sayings, rites of passage, ordinary activities of the family, and epithets is the basis for accepting a head not only in any association or group but also in the government — at the national level and its sub-units (province, city, municipality, and barangay). This is also the cultural basis for the continuity of the tendency of the emergence of dominant chiefs in spite of changes of men and administrations from period to period in Philippine political history. When crises or difficult problems confront the polity, the tendency is strengthened until it is fully established as dominant and strong leadership.

IV

Is the pangulo regime of the pre-Spanish barangay still applicable to the country today? We raised this question in the preceding section, but laid it aside in order to review briefly and quickly the stages of development of the Philippine polity from the Spanish era to the present. That review was undertaken in order to serve as link between the past which we visited and the present and the future which shall concern us from now on. This question actually is a part of a larger relevant problem: What kind of regime is appropriate for the Philippines today and in the future? To answer this properly and validly, we must consider not only Philippine historical experience and cultural tendencies in the field of governance but also present and future critical problems of the country.

The present state of affairs and problems of the Philippines today involve four crises — the crisis of identity, the crisis of participation, the crisis of distribution, and the crisis of government. These crises are likely to continue in the future, at least up to the year 2000 A.D. because these critical problems are not easily resolved. Furthermore, they are aggravated by two inevitable and inexorable trends involving the population and natural resources of the country, the two principal elements in national development.

The first crisis which confronts and will confront the Philippines is the crisis of identity. Like practically all less developed countries (LDC's), the Philippines is fragmented by ethnic, linguistic, and, to some extent, religious divisions. This fragmentation has been aggravated by the archipelagic structure of the country, its colonial past which introduced conflicting alien cultures, and its transitional nature today in that at present

[21] Emilio Jacinto, *Liwanag at Diliman*, in JOSE P. SANTOS, BUHAY AT MGA SINULAT NI EMILIO JACINTO 36 (1935). Translation by the author.

the country is in transition from tradition to modernity. Hence, Filipinos have been troubled by the identity question — who are they? In the Batasang Pambansa, this problem was raised in Parliamentary Bill No. 195, proposing to change the name of the country from Republic of the Philippines to Maharlika.[22]

The Philippines today is also in the midst of a crisis of participation. This has come about because significant social forces are emergent or newly emerged, asking for their place under the sun. But the political and strategic elites, who presently run or control central positions in the polity, the economy, and other important sectors of society, tend to be reluctant to give up their elite positions. The emergent or newly emerged elites, as well as traditional elites who had lost their hold on top governmental positions owing to the declaration of martial law, therefore, have launched movements in order to win the places they believe they are entitled to. Thus, there exists at present the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) movement, which is led by former Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and former Senator Gerardo Roxas. But there are also other movements, such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno, the Light-a-Fire Movement, and those by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP).

Simultaneous with the crisis of participation is the crisis of distribution. The various social, economic, and political forces constituting the society and the polity are currently fighting for an equitable distribution of goods, benefits, and privileges available. There are several concrete cases where this struggle for equitable distribution may be observed, but a few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. The tripartite conference on wages held at Tagaytay last August, 1980, the ongoing negotiations between the national government and various Muslim groups in the South, and the current Batasan hearings and deliberations on the Local Government Code, the Education Bill, and proposed amendments to the Constitution are some of these cases.

Why the crisis of distribution?

There is, in the first place, the progress of education in the Philippines. Literacy had increased from 25 percent in 1903 to 88.9 percent in 1980. People who are literate become aware of alternative life styles; and when under-privileged persons compare their sorry state with those who are highly privileged, at the least they will develop rising expectations in life. They could also become activists and even rebels.

In the second place, there is also the transistor radio revolution in the Philippines. Before 1950 there were not too many households with radio.

[22] Parliamentary Bill No. 195, Introduced by Assemblymen Benjamin V. Bautista and Edgar U. Ilarde, First Regular Session, Batasang Pambansa.

In 1960 households with radio increased to 11 percent. In 1970 this figure rose to 48 percent. People with radio could easily revolutionize their expectations in their life styles, for radio opens up to them more progressive or less dismal ways of living.

Then, in the third place, there are also the propaganda and activities of the counterelite and the political elite. The counterelite, in order to oust the political elite from the government, promise in revolutionary language that the people are entitled to revolutionary change in their status, rights, and roles. The political elite, to maintain themselves in power, likewise speak of revolutionary change, even if actually they are talking only of reforms. For instance, President Diosdado Macapagal in 1963 talked about "our unfinished revolution." Today, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the party established and headed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, is talking about *Today's Revolution: Democracy*. These words and actions of the political elite and the counterelite churn up the dynamic social and political forces of the country, intensifying the revolution of rising expectations. The natural result of all these things is the crisis of distribution.

What is the impact of these crisis — of identity, of participation, and of distribution — on the polity? They give rise to a fourth crisis, the crisis of government. As the loads of the political system increase arising from or fueled by these crises, if the system of government is not changed to accommodate the changing or changed conditions, critical tensions, strains, and stresses mount, manifesting themselves in issues centered on the appropriate form of government needed. Articulate citizens and strategic elites ask: What kind of government is appropriate for the country now — presidential, parliamentary, or something else?

These crises are aggravated by two inevitable and inexorable trends on the population and natural resources, the two vital components of national development. Philippine population has been increasing by leaps and bounds. From 7.6 million in 1903, these numbers jumped to 16 million in 1939, leaped further to 27 million in 1960, and jumped again to reach 42 million in 1975. In the year 2000 A.D. Philippine population is expected to reach 83 million.

While Philippine population has been increasing by leaps and bounds, most of the country's critical natural resources are being destroyed and will be destroyed at dangerously accelerating rates. For instance, during the Carboniferous Period of the Palaezoic Era, about 270 to 350 million years ago, luxuriant forests abounded in the archipelago. Until 1900, the country still abounded in luxuriant forests. By 1950, however, several provinces had already been denuded of their first-growth forest cover. In the year 2000 A.D. according to the research group which produced the Population, Resources, Environment and Philippine Futures (PREPF) *Probing*

Our Futures, all the first-growth forests of the Philippines will be gone.[23] If this will be the fate of the country's forests, it could be also the fate of Philippine rivers and seas which are getting polluted by technological wastes, the fish and other aquatic or marine life which are being poisoned in these waters by industrial effluents and other pollutants, and the mineral ores which are being extracted from the country's subsoil and seabeds. The progressive destruction of these natural resources will naturally lead to the progressive intensification of the crisis of distribution and the crisis of government.

The presidential regime definitely will not be the appropriate system to tackle these crises and grim trends. The characteristic features of this system — separation of powers, coordinate branches of the government, and checks and balance — are principles which institutionalize or legitimize the existence of polycephalic leadership in the worst of times or dicephalic, perhaps, tricephalic, leadership in the best of times. In any case, this kind of political leadership brings about bickerings, endemic maneuvering for power positions, and paralysis of the policymaking process, both in the stage of formulation and adoption of policies and in the stage of implementation of policies.

This assessment of the presidential system is not meant to defend the position that national executives should not be countervailed at all; it is made only to emphasize the point that there is a need for a stronger executive than that allowable by a presidential system. In Section VI of this paper, I actually provide for a countervailing system; but this kind of countervailing power is not the same as what obtains under a presidential system.

The parliamentary regime is not appropriate either for the Philippines, for the conditions which support the success of a parliamentary system do not exist in the country today. What exist in the Philippines are conditions which will bring about its failure.

The basic principle of a parliamentary regime is the supremacy of the Parliament. From this principle is derived the corollary that the government or the cabinet, which includes the Prime Minister as a *primus inter pares,* is responsible to the Parliament. This is the principle of cabinet responsibility, which implies that once the Parliament has no more confidence on the cabinet or the government, the latter resigns; or its Prime Minister advises the Sovereign, where it exists, or the ceremonial executive, where no Sovereign exists, to call for a new election of the members of Parliament in order to test the popular support for the policy or program of the government. If the government's parliamentary supporters win the election, then the government is sustained by the members of the new Parliament; if the Opposition's parliamentary supporters win the election, then a new

[23] (Metro-Manila: PREPF, 1980), p. 104.

government is installed by the new Parliament, thus vindicating the principle of parliamentary supremacy once more.

Where the parliamentary system works successfully, as in England, the mother of Parliaments, the government is stable for a long period. It does not collapse frequently as in Weimar Germany, the French Fourth Republic, or present-day Italy. Even if the Parliament is supreme, in the sense that it can enact any law, including one that abolishes the Bill of Rights, owing to its self-restraint, loyalty to the national interest, and high sense of responsibility, it does not abolish the Bill of Rights or destroy hallowed institutions, like the monarchy, academic freedom, and the like.

What, then, are the conditions which support a parliamentary regime? Since England's case is a classic example of a successful parliamentary system, the conditions supportive of the parliamentary regime in the United Kingdom will be examined here for enlightenment.

In the 13th century, during the time of Magna Carta, there was no Parliament in existence, but there were great lords who were in conflict with the king. These barons were able to compel the king to promulgate Magna Carta in 1215, which recognized important rights of barons in practice although the great charter actually spoke of recognizing the rights of "free men." The assembly of these barons was the seed from which the present Parliament grew. In 1265, Simon de Montfort summoned a Parliament, although this body was not yet a legislative body. However, its system of representation was becoming expanded a little. By the Glorious Revolution in 1688, Parliament had already expanded its popular base and developed its characteristic spirit reflected in the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.[24] This legislative body which won parliamentary sovereignty in a long struggle with the King matured as a parliamentary system by the end of World War I when British political parties had become well-established and highly disciplined mass organizations and the electorate had become universalized.

In other words, the first condition for the success of the parliamentary system in England is a long evolutionary process that covered at least six hundred years which germinated, developed, and matured the idea of parliamentary sovereignty supported by disciplined mass-organized political parties and universal suffrage.[25] The second condition is a political culture

[24] A. V. Dicey wrote: "The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament... has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament." INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-40 (1952).

[25] Agpalo, *A Parliamentary or Semi-Parliamentary System For the Philippines*, SOLIDARITY 58-59 (1971). For the development of the British parliamentary system, see the following: A. F. POLLARD, THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT (1964); JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT (1957); JENNINGS, CABINET GOVERNMENT (1965).

which is a product of this long evolution, which is a culture of "self-restraint and moderation as a virtue of all men when confronted with political responsibility", to use Friedrich's words.[26] The third condition is the transformation of the well-organized and highly disciplined political parties into a two-party system, providing vigorous support to a government and an opposition that is responsible, policy-oriented, and stable.

These conditions obtaining in England do not exist in the Philippines today. What appear to obtain in the country are the same conditions which brought about the failure of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan in 1958. What are these conditions?

According to the Constitution Commission which was created to study the collapse of the parliamentary regime in Pakistan, the most important factors which caused the failure of the parliamentary system were "lack of discipline and solidarity in the political parties and general lack of character in the politicians." Dr. Choudhury elaborated:

> The Constitution Commission quoted Sir Winston Churchill's concept of the "duties of a member of parliament" and noted with regrets the members of the legislature in Pakistan, on an average, with a few honourable exceptions, did not regard any of these duties as binding on them. They were, on the other hand mainly concerned with their individual interest. Even in the first year of Pakistan, when the enthusiasm for building up the new country was at the highest, personal rivalry started among the members of the party in power.[27]

In the Philippines, for instance, in 1962, after President Diosdado Macapagal started his four-year term after his election in 1961, numerous members of the Nacionalista Party abandoned their party and joined the Liberal Party of President Macapagal. In 1966, the reverse exodus occurred. This time, numerous members of the Liberal Party left their party and joined the Nacionalista Party, the party of the President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was elected as President in 1965. In 1978, numerous members of the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party joined the KBL, the newly organized movement which in 1980 became a political party of the New Society established by President Marcos. The behavior of most of the members of the Liberal Party and the Nacionalista Party from 1961 to 1981, as shown in the in-and-out movements from one party to the other, with a constant pattern of joining the party of the administration, definitely indicates that both the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party are not well-organized, highly disciplined, and program-oriented parties; and that most of their members are not loyal or responsible to their respective parties. It is too early to make a definite academic assessment of the KBL as a party and of their members as responsible party men. Considering, however, that most of the members of the KBL were former Nacionalistas and Liberals,

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[26] FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 387 (1968).
[27] CHOUDHURY, DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN 135 (1963).

a tentative hypothesis concerning their political behavior would be that it will be more or less the same as that of the members of the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party.

If the presidential system and the parliamentary regime are not appropriate for the Philippines at present, then, some other regime has to be adopted. Considering the historical experience and cultural tendencies as reviewed and analyzed in Section III and the present and future crises and grim trends confronting and will be confronted by the country as discussed in an earlier part of this Section, the necessity for a pangulo regime is both logical and practical. It is logical because a strong government with a strong executive, which a pangulo regime provides, can tackle adequately and effectively the crises of identity, of participation, of distribution, and of government, as well as the inexorable trends of the population and natural resources which confront the Philippines today and will confront in the future. It is also practical because a country cannot run away from its history and culture.

Besides the logical necessity and the practical ground for adopting a pangulo regime in the Philippines, there is a third reason to consider: the pangulo regime provides an ideal to live by and to live for. This is the ideal of sharing and caring which is inherent in the precept: "Ang sakit ng kalingkingan, ay damdam ng buong katawan."

Will the pangulo regime applicable to the country at present be in the nature of a communal pangulo regime as discussed in Section II?

Definitely, it cannot be in the nature of a communal pangulo regime of the pre-Spanish barangay, for the Philippines today is a macro-political system, no longer a micro-political system. Instead of being small and homogeneous as in the past, it is now a vast system composed of numerous and heterogeneous people. Instead of one community based primarily on kinship ties, it is now a poly-communal state composed of different ethno-linguistic groups. Instead of being a traditional community, with simple division of labor, self-sufficient economy based on primitive agriculture, fishing, and hunting, few social roles, uncomplicated politics, and sacral culture, it is now a modernizing society with complex division of labor, an economy that is primarily agricultural but industry and manufacturing are already making significant progress, numerous social roles, complex politics, and a culture that is becoming secularized.

Under these new and different conditions, can a pangulo regime, which is an organic and hierarchical system, still apply?

The answer to this is affirmative, if certain conditions exist. First, the people and the political elite perceive or believe that the society and the polity are bodies. Since Filipinos today, whether Ilocano, Tagalog, Ilongo, Tausog, or otherwise, still use languages which structure the society and the

polity as bodies, and they go through rites of passage which inculcate the idea of the family as a united body, this condition still exists. However, at the national level the domain or intensity of the perception or belief may be limited or weak, for the Philippines as a state is composed of competing or even conflicting groups. This fact, however, may be changed through national integration under integrative forces, such as religion, politics, sports, trade, education, government, the military, the arts, and sciences. Second, the value of organic hierachy, prescribing that *"ang sakit ng kalingkingan ay damdam ng buong katawan"* is still being taught or given as advice to Filipinos. There is no doubt that this precept is still taught or transmitted from one generation to another. Third, the people in the society have not been transformed into classes, understood in the Marxist sense of vast numbers of people linked to a mode of production who are aware of their interest as a collectivity and are locked in a struggle against other classes. Filipinos, in general, are not yet transformed into classes. Fourth, the social entity is composed of hierarchical parts, some of which are minor, the others are major, and some part serves as head. This condition still obtains, for in social and political organizations dominant chiefs tend to emerge.

Having made these observations, it can be concluded that the pangulo regime still is applicable, although it cannot be in the nature of a communal pangulo regime. Instead, it is in the nature of a *societal* pangulo regime. The adjective *societal* here is not used as a derivative of *gessellschaft* (society) as theorized by Tonnies, for he used gessellschaft as an absolute contrast to *gemeinschaft*. Thus, to Tonnies, a gessellschaft is an aggregate of individuals who lack mutual familiar relations with one another, each motivated only by self-interest, and hence in their transactions with one another the situation comes close to a Hobbesian state of nature.[28] Instead, societal is used here to mean of, or pertaining to a system composed of several communities, each community not completely trusting the others owing to different mores, languages, and other distinguishing features, but as a whole system the individuals who constitute it have many common traits owing to common historical experience, cultural values, physical features, and other characteristics that distinguish their entire system from other systems. *Societal,* then, in other words, refers to that which is characteristic of any large, pluralistic, and autonomous set of individuals and groups, such as Hawaii, Thailand, Lebanon, or France.

[28] Tonnies characterized a gesellschaft as follows: "Gesellschaft, an aggregate by convention and law of nature, is to be understood as a multitude of natural and artificial individuals, the wills, and spheres of whom are in many relations with and to one another, and remain nevertheless independent of one another and devoid of mutual familiar relationships.... In Gesellschaft every person strives for that which is to his own advantage and he affirms the actions of others only insofar as and as long as they can further his interest. Before and outside of convention and also before and outside of each special contract, the relation of all to all may therefore be conceived as potential hostility or latent war." *Op. cit., supra,* note 8 at 76-77.

Owing to the fact that this pangulo regime is a *societal* pangulo regime,[29] its politics is very much different from the politics of a communal pangulo regime. This kind of politics exhibits characteristics appropriate to the societal nature of the regime.

In terms of the politics of the political elite, it is a politics of incorporation and paternalism, as that which takes place in a communal pangulo regime, but added to this is a *politics of integration and mobilization.* Spontaneous cooperative effort, mutual support, and deferential behavior do not take place in this poly-communal system; hence, the groups, individuals, and sectors which compose it will have to be mobilized and integrated if the whole society is to act as an organization and carry out its policies or objectives.

In terms of the politics of strategic elites, the leaders of significant interest groups and political parties, it is a politics of bargaining with one another either to advance exclusive group interests or to form alliances in order to protect or promote larger interests. Vis-a-vis the Pangulo, it is a politics of defensive action, *pakiusap* (supplication), or accommodation. This kind of politics follows, owing to the vast powers and resources of the Pangulo.

In terms of the politics of the counterelite composed of significant leaders in the system who aim to oust the Pangulo and his supportive political elites from the government, it is a politics of either constructive criticism, if they are non-revoutionary; or a politics of rebellion, if they are revolutionary.

And, finally, in terms of the politics of the people, whether as citizens, publics, interest groups, or political parties, it is a politics of apathy, *pakiusap* (supplication), grumbling, accommodation, agitation, or civic action, depending upon their individual or group interests, as well as resources and experiences.

V

In the preceding section, this paper argued that considering the difficult and critical problems confronting the country and her historical experience with regard to political leadership, as well as the cultural factors at work concerning governance, the system of government appropriate for the Philippines is a pangulo regime. However, considering also that the Filipino

[29] In an earlier paper, I called the societal pangulo regime as superimposed organic-hierarchical regime. See the author's "The Organic-Hierarchical Regime: Towards a Theory of Philippine-Politics," Discussion Paper 80-1, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, 11 July 1980. The idea of pangulo regime, however, was adumbrated in the author's article, *The Philippine Political System in the Perspective of History,* 15 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 239-258 (1971). The author advocated a pangulo regime, with modifications as appropriate for the Philippines at the public hearing of the Special Committee on Constitutional Amendments, on December 18, 1980, at the Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City.

polity is no longer a micropolitical system but instead is a macro-polity composed of numerous and heterogeneous individuals, sectors, and groups inhabiting a vast territory, this pangulo regime will be of the societal variety, not the communal type. One aspect of the politics of the societal pangulo regime which was explicitly identified is the politics of integration and mobilization. Considering the implications of this kind of politics and the fact that the pangulo of the regime is vested with tremendous powers and endowed with vast resources, one may conclude that the great danger of this regime is the tendency towards dictatorship or tyranny.

This danger should be faced seriously, for Lord Acton once observed: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."[30] However, the dictum should not be adopted without qualification. The prediction in this aphorism could indeed come true, but then it may not. In any case, one can also say correctly: Without power, nothing can be done, including the just and good act; and absolute justice and goodness cannot be effected without absolute power.

Power, per se, in other words, is neither good nor evil. It all depends on the procedure and the ends. If power is used in accordance with justice or due process and the ends for which it is expended are good, then power is not evil.

The conclusion, therefore, that follows from this analysis is: The Pangulo in a pangulo regime could become a tyrant or a dictator, but he could also become a just and good leader.

To pursue the issue further whether the Pangulo could become a tyrant or a just leader, let us consider the question: Is there a redeeming ideal in a pangulo regime which can guide the Pangulo to the path of goodness and justice?

This question is raised because moral ideals are basic to man. Without a great ideal, a regime is but a machine, without a heart and a soul. And as such, it cannot be legitimate.

There is a redeeming ideal in a pangulo regime. This ideal is found in the value of organic hierarchy, which posits that "Ang sakit ng kalingkingan ay damdam ng buong katawan." This ideal is that of *pagdamay*, or sharing with and caring for others. The other name for pagdamay is *pagibig* or love, for how can one share with or care for others unless he is moved by love?

The pagdamay we are describing here is clear in the acts of mutual sharing and caring in a Filipino family, for instance, during a death in that family, which were mentioned in Section III of this paper. It may be found also among Filipinos in the sacrifices made by parents and brothers or sisters

[30] DALBERG-ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (1948).

working hard in the farm or factory and saving most of their meager earnings in order to send at least one member of the family to obtain a college education. Pagdamay, in a larger setting, is found in the practice of *bayanihan* or helping one another during planting rice in the fields, transfering a house in the town, celebrating a fiesta in a city district, and the like.

At the national level, two examples of the working of pagdamay are presented in order to illustrate that pagdamay is love. Our first example is a provision in a constitution for a republic by Macario Sakay, a Filipino revolutionary leader who continued the fight of the Katipunan and the Philippine Republic of the Philippine Revolution after these collapsed at the beginning of the century. The second example is the martyrdom of Dr. Jose Rizal, the national hero of the Philippines, in 1896.

In Sakay's Constitution, one article provides:

> *Ang sino mang tagalog ay magtataglay nang magandang kaugalian, at mabuting kaisipan, huwag ilalayo sa puso ang gawang pagdamay sa kapwa, at pag-ibig na dalisay sa kadugo, gayon din sa tinubuang lupa, lalung lalu na sa ikaaayos at ikagagaling sa kalahatan dito sa Kapuluan.*[31]

Below is Ileto's translation of the quoted article. The words enclosed in parentheses are my emendations. Instead of "Tagalog", I put "Filipino" because the latter is more in accordance with the spirit of the last phrase of the article, "all in this archipelago", i.e., all the people in the Philippines. I changed the word "compatriots" to "blood brothers" because *kadugo* literally means "a fellowman of the same blood". I included "sharing and caring" for the benefit of non-Tagalogs.

> Every (Filipino) should cultivate a good manner of behavior and a good mind; he should not estrange his heart from acts of *damay* (sharing with and caring) for his fellowmen and from genuine love for his (blood brothers) and his nativeland, especially for the benefit of all in this archipelago.[32]

It is important to note in the above quotation that terms characteristic of a pangulo regime are found — organic terms like *puso* (heart) and *kadugo* (blood brothers) — and all these are related to *pagdamay sa kapwa* (sharing with and caring for his fellowmen) and *pagibig na dalisay* (genuine love). At the same time, all these, too, are related to *kalahatan* (all the people) and *kapuluan* (archipelago), the popular and geographical bases of the Philippine political system. The reason for the juxtaposition of all these terms is that pagdamay is love, and pagdamay is a spirit which encompasses the entire archipelago, so that all the people who compose it become one body. Without pagdamay or love, the archipelago would not be a national body, and the general welfare or well-being of all the people would not be possible.

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[31] Quoted in R. C. ILETO, PASYON AND REVOLUTION 222 (1979).
[32] Translation by ILETO, *ibid.*, p. 222.

Rizal's martyrdom in 1896 should be interpreted as a manifestation of the working of pagdamay. Rizal was aware that he was not merely an individual or a Tagalog from the province of Laguna. He realized that he was a citizen of the Philippines, which in his farewell poem he called "my idolized Motherland,. . . beloved Philippines."

In the same poem, he stated that he had dreams for his motherland. Rizal said:

> My dreams, when life first opened to me,
> My dreams, when the hopes of youth beat high
> Were to see thy lov'd face, O gem of the Orient Sea.
> From gloom and grief, from care and sorrow free;
> No blush on thy brow, no tear in thine eye.[33]

Earlier, Rizal had written to Mariano Ponce, a colleague in the Propaganda Movement, proposing to the latter that their mission should be nation-building. Rizal said: "Let this be our motto: Service to the Motherland. On the day when all Filipinos should think like us, on that day we shall have fulfilled our arduous mission, which is the formation of the Filipino nation."[34]

When the final moment came when he was to be executed for what he had done in connection with nation-building in the country, which the Spanish rulers interpreted as treason, Rizal accepted his death gladly and with equanimity, knowing fully that he was giving his life for the redemption of the Philippines. The following two other stanzas from Rizal's farewell poem showed his supreme act of pagdamay for the Motherland eloquently:

> 1. Farewell, dear (motherland), clime of the sun caress'd,
> Pearl of the Orient seas, our Eden lost!
> Gladly now I go to give thee this faded life's best,
> And were it brighter, fresher, or more blest
> Still would I give it thee, nor count the cost.
>
> 2. Dream of my life, my living and burning desire.
> All hail! cries the soul that is now to take flight,
> All hail! and sweet it is for thee to expire;
> To die for thy sake, that thou mayest aspire,
> And sleep in thy bosom eternity's long night.[35]

The value of pagdamay which is Filipino folk wisdom had been intuited, recognized, and written about by great Western moral poets and religious leaders. John Donne and St. Paul are the most eloquent of these great ethical authors.

Consider these lines from John Donne, an English writer of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries:

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[33] Translation by Charles Derbyshire.

[34] Letter of Jose Rizal to Mariano Ponce, July 27, 1888, in JOSE RIZAL, REMINISCENCES AND TRAVELS 304 (1961).

[35] Translation by Charles Derbyshire.

No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe,
Every man is a peece of the Continent,
a part of the maine;
If a Clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the lesse,
As well as a Promontorie were, as well as
a mannor of thy friends
or of thine owne were;
Any mans death diminishes me
because I am involved in Mankinde;
And therefore never send to know for whom
the bell tolls;
It tolls for thee.[36]

In these lines, especially the last three, the concept of pagdamay is eloquently put, although the words "Iland", "Continent", "Clod", and "Promontorie" are not organic, since they are geographical.

In St. Paul's writings, pagdamay is explicitly advocated, and the organic and hierarchical aspects of Christianity are likewise explicitly posited. These ideas are found in most of St. Paul's letters, but two quotations are sufficient examples.

1. Just as a human body, though it is made of many parts, is a single unit because all these parts, though many, make one body, so it is with Christ....

If one part is hurt, all parts are hurt with it. If one part is given special honour, all parts enjoy it.

Now you together are Christ's body; but each of you is a different part of it.[37]

2. There is one Body, one Spirit, just as you were all called into one and the same hope when you were called...

If we live by truth and in love, we shall grow in all ways into Christ, who is the head by Whom the whole body is fitted and joined together, every joint adding its own strength, for each separate part to work according to its function. So the body grows until it has built itself up, in love.[38]

Since pagdamay or love is a precept of the pangulo regime, whether communal or societal, this regime is a moral community. Since the Pangulo is morally obliged to follow pagdamay the Pangulo has a great ideal to live by or to live for. If the Pangulo lives by and lives for the precept of pagdamay, he cannot or will not become a tyrant or dictator.

VI

There is a need, however, to provide for principles and institutions which shall regulate and countervail the Pangulo in case he does not follow

[36] Quoted in HEMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS, Epigraph (1940).
[37] 1 Corinthians, 12: 12-13 and 26-27, *Jerusalem Bible* (1968).
[38] Ephesians, 4:4-6 and 15-16, *Jerusalem Bible*. The doctrines of St. Paul in this letter, as well as in the earlier one, reinforce the Filipino cultural value of organic hierarchy or pagdamay.

the precept of pagdamay. Pagdamay is a value — a great ideal that is an integral part of a pangulo regime — but it is not self-operating. Like the great principle of rule of law, which is an integral value of all constitutional systems, it has to realize itself in the practical world of government of men. Moreover, there is the fact of the frailty and finitude of human nature, even if man by nature also has the capacity for civilization.

These principles and institutions which must be provided are those of liberal democracy. If these are incorporated in the pangulo regime, then the polity will be, on the one hand, effective — i.e., the political system, indeed, will be able to govern — and on the other hand, libertarian and democratic.

In practical and precise constitutional terms, what should be provided in the constitution in order to have a pangulo regime that is libertarian and democratic? More specifically, what provisions of the 1935 and the 1973 Philippine Constitutions should be retained, amended, and discarded in order to get a pangulo regime which promotes and insures liberty and democracy?

Taking care of the pangulo aspect of the Constitution first, the fundamental action is to retain those provisions which will establish a strong executive and discard those which preserve the basic features of the presidential and parliamentary forms of government. Likewise, amendments of important provisions should be effected in order to follow the spirit of the thrust of the fundamental action.

First, the Pangulo, like the President under the 1935 Constitution, should be elected directly by the people. This means that the following section of the 1935 and 1973 constitutions should be retained: "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people, and all government authority emanates from them."[39] At the same time, a section shall be provided explicitly in the constitution that the Pangulo shall be elected directly by the qualified voters. These provisions will not only guarantee the democratic nature of the Pangulo but at the same time they will also insure the strength and legitimacy of the Pangulo, for he will derive his authority and powers from the people.

Second, the provisions in the 1935 Constitution on certain roles of the Executive should be retained. To be explicit, the Pangulo should retain the roles of the President under the 1935 Constitution, as follows: Chief of State (ceremonial executive); Chief Executive (real executive); Chief Administrator; Chief of Foreign Relations; Grantor of Pardons, Reprieves, and Commutations and Remitter of Fines and Forfeitures, as well as Grantor of Amnesties, with the concurrence of the Legislature; and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with amendments which will be specified later.

Third, the Pangulo should be a Chief Legislator. This provision entails the scuttling of a fundamental characteristic of the presidential regime pro-

[39] CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 1; and CONST. (1973), art. II, sec. 1.

vided in the 1935 Constitution — that which provides for the coequality of the Executive and the Legislature and the separation of the former from the latter — and the retention of some features, although discarding all the important characteristics, of the parliamentary system provided in the 1973 fundamental law. This means that the Pangulo will not be a mere participant in the lawmaking process as the President was under the 1935 Constitution; instead he will be a director and controller of the legislative process as the Prime Minister under the 1973 Constitution.

What changes should be made in the 1935 and 1973 constitutions in order to produce a Chief Legislator for a Pangulo regime?

With regard to the changes that should be made, the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution "to determine the guidelines of national policy"[40] should be transferred to the Pangulo. Likewise, the power of the Cabinet under the same constitution to calendar bills except those of local application[41] should be transferred to the Pangulo.

As regards those changes that should be made relating to the 1935 Constitution, the veto power of the President[42] should be given to the Pangulo; and it ought to be made absolute, i.e., it cannot be overriden by the legislative body even if it musters at least two-thirds of the votes of its members.

To insure that the pangulo regime will not become a parliamentary system, all provisions in the 1973 Constitution that relate to parliamentarism should be discarded. The most important of these include those which require the Prime Minister and the Cabinet responsible for its program of government to the legislature,[43] provide for the withdrawal of confidence by the National Assembly from the Prime Minister,[44] and provide for the dissolution of the National Assembly by the President upon advice by the Prime Minister.[45]

The fact that the Pangulo is made a Chief Legislator does not mean that the legislative power vested in the National Assembly under the 1973 Constitution is transferred to the Pangulo. Under the societal pangulo regime envisioned in this paper, the legislative power remains vested in the National Assembly. The legislators continue to exercise the power to introduce bills and resolutions, to discuss and deliberate on them, to conduct committee hearings, to investigate various matters in relation to legislation, to approve or disapprove legislative measures, and others related to legislation.

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[40] CONST., art. IX, sec. 2.
[41] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 19 (3).
[42] CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 20, (1) & (2).
[43] CONST., art. IX, sec. 2.
[44] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 13 (1).
[45] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 13 (2).

In other words, the National Assembly, as in a presidential system, can still play the role of countervailing power against the Pangulo in case the Pangulo abuses his authority, except that this kind of power is significantly diminished owing to the fact that the Pangulo has been given, among others, a strategic role in the legislative process by authorizing him to calendar all bills except only those of local application. Nevertheless, in spite of this fact, considering that the legislators are many, with the weapon of *la ultima razon,* i.e., the power to approve or disapprove laws, as long as they commit themselves as trustees of the nation and the national interest and carry out their role of legislator seriously by studying the bills and resolutions introduced in the legislature, especially those that are under discussion in the committees and in plenary session, seriously and thoroughly, there is no valid reason why the legislators would be transformed into a "rubber stamp" of the Pangulo.

Now, to proceed to the principles and institutions of liberal democracy which should be incorporated in the Pangulo regime, so that in case the Pangulo does not follow the guidelines of pagdamay, owing to the frailty and finitude of human nature, there are two important things to be done.

Firstly, the constitution of the pangulo regime should incorporate the five principles of liberal democracy which are already provided in the 1973 Constitution, namely: 1) popular sovereignty;[46] 2) inviolability of the bill of rights, which must include civil, political, and social rights;[47] 3) the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law;[48] 4) the separation of church and state;[49] and 5) the supremacy of civilian authority over the military.[50]

Secondly, the commander-in-chief clause of the 1935 and 1973 constitutions should be amended in order to read as follows:

> The (PANGULO) shall be Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of writ of *habeas corpus,* or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law, (PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT DURING SUCH MARTIAL LAW, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE JUDICIARY SHALL NOT BE ABOLISHED, OR PUT IN A STATE OF SUSPENDED ANIMATION; PROVIDED, ALSO, THAT THE BILL OF RIGHTS, DURING SUCH MARTIAL LAW, EXCEPT ONLY IN CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY, SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN INVIOLATE; AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT THE CONSTITUTION, DURING SUCH MARTIAL LAW, SHALL NOT BE AMENDED.[51]

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[46] CONST., art. II, sec. 1.
[47] CONST., art. IV; art. VI; and art. II, secs. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9.
[48] CONST., art. X.
[49] CONST., art. IV, sec. 8.
[50] CONST., art. II, sec. 8.

VII

The pangulo regime which I have in mind, therefore, provides for a strong executive elected by the people but at the same time it also provides for certain principles and institutions which will insure that the regime will be both liberal and democratic.

The provision for a strong executive is a recognition of the need for such a leader in the Philippines, since the country today is confronted and in the future will be confronted by grave crises of identity, of participation, of distribution, and of government, as well as by inexorable trends in population and natural resources, which crises and trends can be tackled or coped with only by a strong executive. The provision for a strong executive is also a recognition of the fact that, in any case, we cannot run away from our history and culture. We can change the direction of our history, and we can transform our culture; but in the nature of things, these can be effected with success only incrementally. If these are done abruptly, the result is profound cultural dissonance which results in instability, unrest and dislocation, and failure of the introduced change, as amply shown in the unhappy and humbling experiences of most of the African and Asian countries, including the Philippines.

The provision for liberal democracy is to insure that the great ideal of pagdamay of the pangulo regime is promoted and implemented not only by the people but also by the political elite, including the Pangulo. Its provision is also made in order to vindicate a great principle which the Philippine Revolution of 1896-1901 articulated. What is this great principle? It is none other than the idea that the people are all-important: they are the end of all governments. As Emilio Jacinto, the Brains of the Katipunan, said: "The welfare of the people is the only end of all governments on earth because the people are everything: blood and life, wealth and power, all values are for the people."[52]

The blending of the pangulo principle and liberal democracy is a synthesis; and this synthesis may be called a Filipino liberal democracy.[53] It is a liberal democracy because, like the liberal democracies of England, the United States, and France, it enthrones the minimal requirements of a liberal democracy — liberty and popular sovereignty — in the constitution. It is Filipino, for it has a nuance which is characteristically Filipino; i.e., the pangulo principle, which includes the ideal of pagdamay.

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[51] CONST. (1935), art. VIII, sec. 10 (2) and CONST., art. IX, sec. 12.

[52] Agpalo, *Liwanag at Dilim: The Political Philosophy of Emilio Jacinto,* Professorial Chair Lectures, Monograph No. 21, p. 11 (1976). The original is in SANTOS, *op. cit., supra,* note 21 at 39.

[53] The author's idea of Filipino liberal democracy first appeared in his writings in 1971 in THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY, pp. 257-258. It also appeared in *The Organic-Hierarchical Paradigm and Politics in the Philippines* and in his address as outgoing President of the Philippine Political Science Association entitled "In Defense of Filipino Liberal Democracy" on June 27, 1976. This speech may be found in *3 Philippine Political Science Journal,* 140-149 (1976).

American, English, and French liberal democracies can be understood clearly if contrasted to a Filipino liberal democracy by noting and identifying the characteristic peculiar attributes which are found in each of them. The American variety of liberal demoracy, in addition to liberty and popular sovereignty which it enthrones, also incorporates distinctively American principles, such as equality, separation of powers and checks and balance (presidentialism), and federalism. The English type of liberal democracy, aside from enshrining liberty and popular sovereignty, also incorporates the monarchy, parliamentarism, and liberty in terms of status. The French system of liberal democracy, besides including liberty and popular sovereignty, is also inspired by a battlecry — Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. It also includes a pendulum swing from one historical tradition to another — a great-leader phenomenon, as embodied in Charlemagne, Louis XIV, Bonaparte, and de Gaulle; and anarchy, as manifested in the French Revolution, the revolution that led to the Paris Commune of 1871, and the Student Revolution of 1968. In between the swings of the pendulum, France develops incrementally, consolidating gains made during revolutionary times, or celebrating a politics of grandeur deemed to belong to France as a matter of right or destiny.

A question at this juncture, however, may be raised: Is it possible to produce a synthesis of the pangulo principle and liberal democracy? Is it not a fact that liberal democracy is a Western idea, an exogenous concept, an alien value? If this is so, then will not Filipino culture reject it, as it rejected the presidential system in 1972-1973?

These points actually beg the question, for they assume that there is no tradition of liberty and democracy in the Philippines. The fact, however, is that there is a tradition of liberty and democracy in the country.

A tradition (from the Latin *tradere,* to transfer or to deliver) is a precious gift that is transferred or delivered from one generation to another.[54] Friedrich says that a political tradition is "a set of convictions and beliefs concerning political community, including the behavior of men as political persons." He continues, stating: "Political tradition defines how rule is conducted, and how the ruled behave towards their rulers, including their electing and controlling them."[55]

First, let us consider the tradition of liberty in the Philippines, even if briefly.

It has been pointed out by the *Maragtas*[56] and other accounts that present-day Filipinos are descendants of people who came from Borneo and elsewhere in Asia who left their native lands in search of freedom owing to tyranny and oppression in their countries of origin. The *Maragtas* is

[54] FRIEDRICH, TRADITION AND AUTHORITY 14 (1972).
[55] *Id.* at 18.
[56] AGONCILLO & ALFONSO, HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE 28-29 (1967).

now being questioned as an authentic document, but myth or not, it is a fact that the tradition that is transmitted in the account is that the ancestors of Filipinos were freedom-loving people.

We have more solid historical data since the arrival of the Spaniards in the Philippines in 1521. While there were other reasons why Lapu-Lapu resisted Magellan, the first circumnavigator of the world, in Mactan, definitely one of them was for the sake of freedom. Muslim Filipinos fought the Spaniards, the Americans, and Filipino administrations since Quezon, among others, also for freedom. Since the time of Lapu-Lapu, there have been hundreds of revolts or movements for liberty in the Philippines. The leaders of the Propaganda Movement, especially Graciano Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, and Jose Rizal, stressed liberty or human rights in their works. Rizal and Jacinto built their political philosophy on the foundation of liberty. The newspaper of the Katipunan of the Philippine Revolution was named *Kalayaan* (Liberty). The central symbol of the Philippine flag, born during the Philippine Revolution, is the sun of liberty. The word liberty throbs in the national anthem, whether in the Spanish, English, or Pilipino version. Finally, the fundamental laws drafted and adopted by Filipinos since the Philippine Revolution have always enshrined a bill of rights — the Constitution of Biak-na-Bato of 1897, the Malolos Constitution of 1899, the 1935 Philippine Constitution, and the 1973 Constitution.[57]

As early as 1900, Americans who have made a careful and thorough study of the Philippines, have observed that human rights are highly valued by Filipinos. Bernas pointed out one such early observation, the one made by a fact-finding commission, which was charged by American authorities to report on the conditions of the Philippines at the beginning of the century. The portion noted by Bernas from the 1900 Schurman Report said:

> The more one studies the recent history of the Philippines and the more one strives by conversations and intercourse with Filipinos to understand and appreciate their political aims and ideals, the more profound one's convictions that what the people want, above everything, is a guarantee of... fundamental human rights.... Every scheme of government devised by the Filipinos is, in primary intent, a means to secure that end.... Philippine plans of reform all start from a concrete basis, they seek

[57] See the author's reply to the question "Is there a tradition of human rights in the Philippines?" in QUISUMBING & BONIFACIO, ED., HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PHILIPPINES 45-47 (1977).

It is important to note that the forty-three interviewees who answered the same question, practically all were unanimous in stating that Filipinos have a tradition of liberal democracy or human rights; and their answers were based on essentially the same facts and value-orientations. Considering that the interviewees represented different sectors — labor, peasantry, business, the professions, media, the arts, the academe, the military, the religious, and the government — and the fact that they were not assembled together in one hall, so that no one knew what the others were giving as replies, their answers indicate that the tradition of liberal democracy in the Philippines is very vigorous among the strategic elites. See *ibid.*, pp. 45-80.

> deliverance, sure and abiding, from wrongs and cruelties to which the people have hitherto been exposed.[58]

With regard to democracy, it cannot be denied that there is also a tradition on this matter in the Philippines.

The tradition of democracy is shorter than that of liberty — if one is strict, perhaps it can be said to have begun only in the Propaganda movement from 1880 to 1895. Nevertheless, it is a tradition of one hundred years, of five generations. The maiden editorial of *La Solidaridad,* the organ of the Propaganda Movement, appearing in 1889, called for the propagation of democracy in the Philippines and abroad. The editorial declared:

> Modest, very modest are our aspirations. Our program aside from being harmless is very simple; to fight all reaction, to hinder all steps backward, to applaud and accept all liberal ideas, and to defend progress; in brief, to be a propagandist above all the ideals of democracy so that these might reign over all nations and beyond the seas.[59]

By the early 1890's, this ideal of democracy was elaborated and concretized in various works — socio-political novels, patriotic speeches, poetry, analytical essays, politics-oriented letters, and other documents, such as the constitution of the *Liga Filipina.*

The tradition of democracy as advocated by the Propaganda Movement was handed down to the Philippine Revolution of 1896-1901. Emilio Jacinto enshrined it in his *"Kartilla", "Pagkatatag ng Pamahalaan sa Hukuman ng Silangan"* (*Hukuman ng Silangan,* in short), and *Liwanag at Dilim.*[60] Section 2 of Jacinto's *"Hukuman ng Silangan"* provided: "Sovereignty resides in the people. This is the guiding principle upon which the government of the East is established."[61] The period of the Katipunan was the first phase of the Philippine Revolution. During the second phase, this tradition was passed on to the founding fathers of the Malolos Constitution of 1899, who enthroned it in Article 3: "Sovereignty resides exclusively in the people."[62]

From the Philippine Revolution this tradition of democracy was transferred to the framers of the 1935 and the 1973 constitutions. The fathers of these fundamental laws safeguarded this legacy, perpetuating it in the article which declares: "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all authority emanates from them."[63]

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[58] *Id.* at 49-50.

[59] *La Solidaridad,* Vol. I, 1889, translated by Guadalupe Fores Ganzon 3 (1967).

[60] These works are in SANTOS, *op. cit., supra,* note 21.

[61] The full text of an English translation of the *"Hukuman ng Silangan"* is in ZAIDE, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN NATIONS 122-127 (1970).

[62] The full text of an English translation of the Malolos Constitution is in GUEVARRA, ED., THE LAWS OF THE FIRST PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC 101-119 (1972).

[63] CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 1; and CONST. (1973), art. II, sec. 1.

Since 1898, Filipinos in order to implement the democratic principle have participated in the elections of public officials. In the beginning only a very small number of the people participated in the elections. In 1907, during the election of members of the Philippine Assembly only about 1.3 per cent of the total population, or 104, 966 individuals, were registered as voters.[64] Gradually, however, the suffrage was broadened by lowering the voting age from 23 to 21 in 1916, granting the women the right to vote in 1937, and lowering the voting age to 18 and removing the literacy qualification in 1973.

Since the independence of the Philippines in 1946, seventeen elections of national and local public officials have been held. The increase of the number of voters who registered and actually voted in the elections is indicated in the following table.

TABLE ON VOTERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1980

Year	*Registered Voters*	*Voters Who Voted*	*Per Cent*
1946[a]	2,898,604	2,596,880	89.6
1947	4,320,671[b]	N.A.	—
1949[a]	5,231,224	3,541,998	67.7
1951	4,754,307	4,391,109	92.4
1953	5,603,231	4,326,706	77.2
1955	6,487,061	5,046,448	77.8
1957	6,763,897	5,108,112	75.5
1959	7,822,472	6,393,724	81.73
1961	8,483,568	6,738,805	79.43
1963	9,691,621	7,712,019	79.57
1965	9,962,345	7,610,051	76.39
1967	9,744,604	7,957,019	81.66
1969	10,300,898	8,202,793	79.63
1970	9,811,431	6,682,905	68.11
1971	11,661,909	9,419,568	80.77
1978	21,463,094	18,355,862	85.52
1980	24,881,021	19,081,270	76.69

SOURCES: Except for a and b, all data were gathered from the Statistical data of the Commission on Elections, Republic of the Philippines.

[a] Hirofumi Ando, "Voting Turnout in the Philippines", *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 13 (October 1969), p. 428.

[b] Virginia F. Baterina, "A Study of Money in Elections in the Philippines", *Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, 20 (March 1955), p. 58.

From the statistical data shown above, it can be seen that the tradition of democracy had reached millions of Filipinos through participation in elections at regular intervals of two years, except in two cases when special elections were held — in this case the interval was one year — and during the martial law period, when the intervals were longer.

[64] AGPALO, THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE RETAIL TRADE IN THE PHILIPPINES 78 (1962).

Since there is a tradition of liberty and democracy in the Philippines, the principles and institutions of liberal democracy recommended to be incorporated in the constitution of the societal pangulo regime will not be rejected by Filipinos. In other words, the pangulo principle in the Philippines whose tradition goes back to the pre-Spanish barangay can be blended with liberal democracy which is a tradition of at least five generations, resulting in a synthesis of Filipino liberal democracy.

VIII

Having brought our discussion of the Philippines from communal pangulo regime to a variety of societal pangulo regime, which I called a Filipino liberal democracy, our academic voyage may be said to be over. Actually, our journey still continues, for three reasons.

First, the kind of societal pangulo regime I have in mind which I argued is appropriate for the Philippines; I believe is equally applicable to some Asian and African countries. It is applicable, of course, if certain conditions are met: 1) Such countries have a tradition of a pangulo, who is an integral part of a larger body composed of many parts to which is prescribed a precept similar to the Filipino value of pagdamay. 2) There also exists in such countries a tradition of liberal democracy, whether the tradition is long or short. 3) In these countries, the crises of identity, participation, distribution, and government, as well as the inexorable trends concerning the population and natural resources, likewise, obtain.

Considering that in Malaysia and Indonesia the Filipino term pangulo is also used in practically the same meaning and even spelling — e.g., *penghulu* — and considering that the other two conditions similarly obtain in those two countries, I would hypothesize that the Filipino liberal-democratic type of regime would be appropriate for Malaysia and Indonesia.

I realize that the term Filipino liberal democracy would not be acceptable to Malaysians and Indonesians, for it includes a particular adjective Filipino. Hence, it is necessary to coin a neutral and general term that will incorporate all the attributes of a Filipino liberal democracy. The term I suggest is liberal-democratic *cephalarchy,* in which the basic word combines *cephal,* from the Greek *kephale* (head), as in the adjective tricephalic; and *archy,* from another Greek word *arkho* (rule), as in monarchy. Liberal-democratic *cephalarchy,* therefore, will replace the term Filipino liberal democracy, when applied to a regime anywhere in the world, whenever the regime in that country meets all the general attributes of a Filipino liberal democracy. The head or agency which serves as head of a liberal-democratic cephalarchy will be called a *cephalarch.*

The hypothesis that liberal-democratic cephalarchy is appropriate for Malaysia and Indonesia, however, entails certain things to be done. One must study Malaysia and Indonesia thoroughly, and find out whether indeed

they have the same general attributes and circumstances as the Philippines today. Such a study will take a long time; therefore, our voyage continues.

The second reason why our journey is not yet terminated is that my concept of Filipino liberal democracy, even if it is applied only to the Philippines, is not a final or perfected model. It is an open one, subject to reformulation as more relevant or neglected data are found to correct its shortcomings or inadequacies.

The third and final reason why we cannot say that the voyage is over is that I do realize that my paper could be criticized on the grounds that it provides, wittingly or unwittingly, a legitimation of dictatorship; or in any case, it does not provide an adequate theory to tackle the problem of dictatorship.

Let me point out that this paper is an attempt to interpret the facts of Philippine political life with a view to explaining why certain patterns of governance happen the way they do and explicating the kind of regime that would be appropriate and viable in the country, given the circumstances that obtain and the critical problems that exist and are likely to exist in the future.

The legitimation of dictatorship is not a witting or unwitting aim of this paper. In my attempt to work towards a theory of Philippine politics, I did not close my eyes on the problem of dictatorship. I met it and attempted to cope with it, for I realize that there will always be tendencies towards dictatorship not only in the Philippines but in all other countries of the Third World or of the First and Second Worlds. I believe that, for us academics especially in political science, dictatorship should be a special concern. We should meet it, chain it, contain it, or if possible, to dissolve its attributes so that it would be banished from human affairs. There will always be tendencies towards dictatorship because, as Machiavelli pointed out, one aspect of human nature is the beastly tendency. Fortunately, there will always be tendencies also towards justice and civilization because, as higher religions have posited, the other aspect of human nature is the tendency towards the good, which is based on the existence of a divine spark in man.

We in the social sciences, especially political science, should invest efforts, time and talent in designing means of making the good in man to triumph over the beastly through our works.

I have attempted in this paper to describe the principal direction of the evolving political institutions of the Philippines. I have also tried to contain dictatorship by caging it in a constitution; to chain it by means of the principles and institutions of liberal democracy; and to dissolve its attributes by using the power of the Filipino cultural value of pagdamay.

If there are better ways of chaining, caging, or banishing the beast, I have an open mind and am willing to adopt them. Of course, I must first be convinced that they are indeed better.

In the meantime, I regard this possible reaction to my paper as an exciting challenge to political scientists, urging us to think our way through or out of the problem. Hence, our voyage continues, perhaps in stormy seas; and we must make an adventure in political science. This is only natural, for, after all, our commitment as social scientists should be that which was stated by Tennyson in "Ulysses:"

> To follow knowledge.... To sail... beyond the western stars....
> To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.[65]

[65] Quoted in AGPALO, THE POLITICAL ELITE AND THE PEOPLE: A STUDY OF POLITICS IN OCCIDENTAL MINDORO vii (1972).

APPENDIX

SOCIETY, POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND SOCIETAL PANGULO REGIME

To clarify and amplify on the terms *society, political system, regime,* and *societal pangulo regime,* this appendix is included as an integral part of this paper.

Society is the broadest set of individuals, aggregates, and groups which live in a definite territory and constitute as a more or less autonomous system. Society is composed of individuals, who may belong to the citizenry, publics, interest groups, political parties, classes, governmental agencies, political elite, counterelite, strategic elites, or apolitical population, each of which has some kind of role or combination of roles.

Citizens here are not defined in a legalistic way, as provided in the Constitution of the Philippines, which states that those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines are *ipso facto* citizens of the Philippines. Instead, a political definition is used; i.e., a *citizen* is a person who participates in public affairs.

A *public* is a number of persons who show an interest in some social issue. An *interest group* is "an organized body of individuals promoting, defending, or articulating some kind of interest or combination of interests either with the government or non-governmental entities."[a] A *political party* is an organized body of individuals or groups who aim to win and control the government. A *governmental agency* is a unit of the machinery of the political system or regime participating in the formulation, adoption, or implementation of some kind of policy.

A *class* is a vast mass of individuals linked to a mode of production who are conscious of their common interests in that mode of production, and, therefore, are locked in a struggle with the other classes as they attempt to attain their respective interests. This definition adopts a Marxist definition of class, except that it is the rigorous view, which Marx himself adopted when he said that until a class-in-itself has become a class-for-itself, it has not yet constituted itself as a class.[b]

The *political elite* are the individuals who are constituted as either an aggregate or organized body of persons who control the higher positions

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[a] Remigio E. Agpalo, *Philippine Interest Groups and Their Role in Political Modernization and Development* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1977), p. 3.

[b] *Marx-Engels Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1964-1968), Vol. 4, pp. 143 and 181. Cited in D. Ross Gandy, *Marx and History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979, p. 110. See also Karl Marx, *Political Writings Volume II, Surveys from Exile* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," pp. 143-249, especially p. 239.

in the government. The *counterelite* are the leaders who attempt to oust the political elite from the government. The counterelite are *revolutionary,* if they use violence; and they are *non-revolutionary,* if they use constitutional means, avoiding the application of violence. The *strategic elites* are the leaders of the significant interest groups and political parties in the society.

The *apolitical population* is that portion of the people who do not participate in public affairs or show any interest in some social issue. In other words, these are the people who have not been mobilized for public affairs.

Role refers to "a set of expected and repeated patterns of behaviour and clusters of attitudes associated with the fulfillment of some social function within the context of a social group."[c] Political roles, therefore, are "the regular behaviour patterns and attitude clusters associated with political functions in the context of political groups, e.g., party leader, President, revolutionary agitator, 'city boss', conciliator in an international conflict."[d]

A *political system* is a set composed the political elite, the counterelite, and the people, with the people articulating interests with the political elite and the counterelite, the political elite attempting to maintain themselves in power and converting the inputs of interests into outputs of public policies, and the counterelite attempting to oust the political elite from the government.

The political system has five dynamic processes: an input process, a conversion process, an output process, a feedback process, and an adversary process. The *input process* involves the articulation and aggregation of interests from the people to the political elite and the counterelite. The *conversion process* involves the processing of the inputs of interests from the people by the political elite and the counterelite, with a view to transforming them into policies or counterprograms. A *policy* is the sum total of decisions of the political elite regarding a particular issue or target. A *counterprogram* is the sum total of counterpositions of the counterelite concerning a particular issue or target. The *output* process involves the activities related to the issuance of either governmental decisions (legislative act, executive decree, administrative regulation, or judicial decision) from the political elite; or the emergence of counterpositions from the counterelite. The *feedback process* involves the reactions of the people and the counterelite to the policies of the political elite; and those of the people and the political elite to the counterprograms of the counterelite. The *adversary process* involves the struggle for power between the political elite

[c] Geoffrey K. Roberts, *A Dictionary of Political Analysis* (London: Longman, 1971), p. 191.
[d] *Ibid.*

and the counterelite, as the former attempt to maintain themselves in the government and advance their power; and the latter try to oust the political elite from the government.[e]

A regime refers to "the particular form of government which is possessed by a polity."[f] Examples of regimes are the parliamentary, the presidential, and societal pangulo, to mention only three kinds. The form of government as understood here is not restricted to the machinery of the government (which includes the political elite) and its procedures, arrangements, and relationships with the people and the counterelite; it also includes its style of governance.

The term pangulo regime, as well as its two subtypes — the communal and the societal — was already discussed in the paper. Here, we shall merely identify the component parts of a societal pangulo regime and its most characteristic feature which distinguishes it from the presidential and parliamentary regimes.

The component parts of a societal pangulo regime are the political elite, led by the *Pangulo;* the strategic elites who have been incorporated or linked integrally with the regime; the counterelites who, likewise, have been incorporated or linked integrally with the regime; and the people who have been similarly articulated with the regime. Among these component parts, the *Pangulo* is the supreme chief of the regime. The *Pangulo* is the chief executive, chief of state, chief administrator, chief legislator, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, party chief, chief of foreign relations, chief exponent of the ideology of the regime, and chief of the nation. This characteristic — the supremacy of the executive — distinguishes this regime from the parliamentary regime, for in the latter it is the parliament which is supreme. The same characteristic also distinguishes this regime from the presidential type, for in the presidential system, the executive is coordinate with the legislature and the judiciary.

Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic picture of the difference among the society, the political system, and the regime. The society, as shown in the diagram, is the broadest. The figure points out that it is the sum total of three spaces — 1, 2, and 3. The political system, on the other hand, is smaller than the society. The smallest space in the diagram is the societal pangulo regime, occupying only space 1. The political system has a medium area, occupying spaces 1 and 2. However, it must be pointed out that a regime could be congruent with a political system, such as the parliamentary

[e] David Easton's model of political system does not include the adversary process, for his model is essentially an equilibrium model. My model takes care of both equilibrium and disequilibrium. Hence, I have included the adversary process in my model of a political system explicitly. See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics,* 9 (April 1957): 383-400; and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

[f] Roberts, *op. cit.,* p. 186.

regime in the United Kingdom and the presidential regime in the United States.

Figure 2 provides a detailed picture of a political system. The figure, in fact, is a model, showing the linkages among the people, the political elite, and the counterelite; and the circular flow of the political process, which is concerned, at one aspect, with the formulation, adoption, and the implementation of policies; and at another aspect, with the struggle for power between the political elite and the counterlite.

(For Figure 1 and Figure 2, see the following two pages.)


CITY POLITICAL ELITE
MILITARY ELITE
PANGULO
PROVINCIAL POLITICAL ELITE
NON-REVOLUTIONARY COUNTER-ELITE
NON-MILITARY NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITE
MUNICIPAL POLITICAL ELITE
BARANGAY POLITICAL ELITE
BOUNDARY OF SOCIETAL PANGULO REGIME
BOUNDARY OF SOCIETY
CITIZENS, PUBLICS, INTEREST GROUPS & POLITICAL PARTIES
APOLITICAL POPULATION
APOLITICAL POPULATION
3 2 1
REVOLUTIONARY COUNTER-ELITE
LEGEND:
1: SOCIETAL PANGULO REGIME
1+2: POLITICAL SYSTEM
1+2+3: SOCIETY


POLICIES:
DOMESTIC
& FOREIGN
FEEDBACK
FEEDBACK
COUNTER
PROGRAMS
POLITICAL ELITE:
LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
MILITARY, ADMINISTRATIVE,
JUDICIAL, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
COUNTER
ELITE
FEEDBACK
PEOPLE:
CITIZENS, PUBLICS,
INTEREST GROUPS,
AND POLITICAL PARTIES
FEEDBACK
FOUNDATIONS:
GEOGRAPHIC, SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC,
ECONOMIC, HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL