

CASE NOTE:

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CREATED BY PRESIDENTIAL ACT

The power to create or establish municipal corporations is a political function which rests solely in the legislative branch of the government. The legislative power to create municipal corporations may not be delegated by the legislature to the courts or to a board or other agency. Any such delegation would be invalid as violative of the constitutional provision separating the powers of government into legislative, executive and judicial departments.¹ However, while the legislative function of creating a municipal corporation cannot be delegated, the legislature may, where the mode of creating a municipal corporation and the conditions under which it may exist are prescribed by a general law, properly leave to the courts or to a commission or board the duty of ascertaining the facts and deciding whether the prescribed conditions have been satisfied and proper steps have been taken under the law to bring the municipality into existence, and having found that the requirements have been complied with, to declare the municipality incorporated.²

DELEGATION OF POWER

The Revised Administrative Code, in its section 68, delegates to the President general authority to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions³ as follows:

"The President may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries of, of any province, subprovince, municipality, township, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: **Provided**, That the authorization of Congress shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When any action by the President in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the President, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new district so formed."

¹Francisco, *Public Corporations*, 18 Law. J., 172 (1953).

²McQuillin, *Municipal Corporations*, 3rd edition, vol. 1 (1949), pp. 515-518, 531.

³Section 68, Revised Administrative Code.

The constitutionality of this provision was challenged in the case of *Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan*⁴ as an undue delegation of power. The Supreme Court, however, summarily disposed of the objection by declaring that the delegation of power made to the Chief Executive does not involve an abdication of legislative functions: that it merely transfers certain details to the Chief Executive because he is better informed of the change of actual conditions as they happen and is, therefore, in a better position to act promptly.⁵

This ruling has been much criticized and its re-examination urged because of later decisions⁶ holding that under the present Constitution the President is given only general supervision over local governments, therefore, the Congress may not grant him greater powers particularly the power of control.⁷ It has been pointed out that although this ruling may be accepted without question as to adjustment of boundaries not involving the creation of new municipalities on the dissolution of existing ones, it was of doubtful constitutionality if the delegation of legislative power to the President in section 68 were to be construed as conferring on the President power to create or dissolve municipalities. The creation or dissolution of a municipality is after all not a matter of detail.⁸ Indeed, the powers conferred on the President by section 68 are sufficiently broad to enable the President to make or create a new municipality. This is evident by a reading of its caption which states: "*General Authority of the President of the Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions.*" It is also significant that under the provisions of Act No. 1748, now incorporated into the Revised Administrative Code as section 68, the Chief Executive was authorized whenever his action resulted in the creation of a new political subdivision, to appoint officers for the new subdivision with such powers and duties as may be required by the existing provisions of law applicable to the case. The appointees were to hold office until the next general election following their appointment. This provision carried with it a clear grant of authority to the Chief Executive to create new political subdivisions, including municipalities, whose officers he could appoint. This provision has been eliminated from the Revised Administrative Code. It is however found in section 10 of

⁴ 36 Phil. 547 (1917).

⁵ Sinco and Cortes, *Philippine Law on Local Governments*, (1959), p. 43.

⁶ *Mondano v. Silvosa*, 51 O.G. p. 2884, 3429 (1955); *Hebron v. Reyes*, G.R: L-9124, July 28, 1958.

⁷ Tañada, *Political Law of the Philippines*, vol. 2, (1962), p. 329.

⁸ Sinco and Cortes, *op. cit.*

the Revised Election Code.⁹ While it is true that Congress can delegate power to determine facts or things, the power of the President traverses beyond the mere act of canvassing data with which Congress shall proceed with a projected legislation to create municipalities. Said section does not provide a structure sufficient enough to be considered the basis of a follow-up procedure to implement the legislative will to create a municipality.¹⁰

It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision that the proper regulation of the "transference of details" require prompt action as may not permit the legislative body to act effectively. Yet, Congress has created municipalities even after the passage of the Revised Administrative Code thereby casting doubt on the substance of that declaration. Furthermore, if Congress cannot act with dispatch with respect to municipalities, it is difficult to accept that it can do so effectively in the case of barrios which are smaller units and more numerous than municipalities.¹¹

After some forty-eight years, the validity of section 68 was again brought in issue before the Supreme Court in the case of *Pelaez v. Auditor General*.¹² The petitioner, as Vice-President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted this action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General, to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders creating thirty-three municipalities and/or any disbursement by said municipalities, alleging that said executive orders are null and void upon the ground that section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent claimed that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon the case of *Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan* as having settled the question. The Supreme Court held that such claim is untenable since the said case did not involve the creation of a new municipality but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binangonan), likewise existing at the time of and prior to said transfer in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of the two municipalities.

⁹ Francisco, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹⁰ Tan, *The Power of the President to Create and Abolish Municipalities* — Re-examined, 39 Phil. L. J., 581 (1964):

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965.

On the question of delegation of power, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, reversed its former ruling upholding the validity of section 68, by declaring that it does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law — it does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President, neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of the exercise of such power. The Court furthermore refused to recognize the phrase "as the public welfare may require" as constituting a sufficient standard for the valid delegation of the authority to execute the law.¹³ That phrase qualifies not the whole section but the final clause since it reads: "*may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.*" (Emphasis supplied). In other words, the phrase may be invoked only with respect to the exercise of the power to transfer the seat of the government. Nevertheless, the conclusion would still be the same even if we assume that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualifies all other clauses of section 68, notwithstanding the *Calalang* and *Rosenthal* cases since "the doctrine laid down in those cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedent and have no binding effect." Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions calling for the determination of a question of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question whether or not "public welfare" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact.

Furthermore, if the term "unfair competition" as used in the National Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" was held to be so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered" resulting in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power¹⁴ "it is obvious that 'public welfare', which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his

¹³ 70 Phil. 726 (1940); 68 Phil. 328 (1939).

¹⁴ *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US*, 79 L. ed. 1570 (1935).

opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold."

Republic Act No. 2370 provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio necessarily implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

It must also be borne in mind that while the President has control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, he merely exercises general supervision over all local governments.¹⁵ Thus, "instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, section 68 reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices."¹⁷

All that has been said does not mean, however, that Congress may no longer delegate to the President the power to create municipalities as long as such authorization meets the requirements for a valid delegation of power. Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of law. However, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, of that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate¹⁸ and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate

¹⁵ Note 11, *supra*.

¹⁶ Section 10 (1) Art. VII of the Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."

¹⁷ Note 7, *supra*.

¹⁸ *Calalang v. Williams*, 70 Phil 726 (1940); *Pangasinan Trans. Co. v. Public Service Commission*, 70 Phil 221 (1940); *Cruz v. Youngberg*, 56 Phil 234 (1931); *Alegre v. Collector of Customs*, 53 Phil. 394 (1929); *Malford v. Smith*, 307 U.S. 38 (1938).

must conform in the performance of his functions.¹⁹ What is prohibited by the Constitution is the delegation of authority to the courts or other agencies to pass upon questions of public policy involved, or to exercise any discretion as to whether the municipal corporation should be created, or to render any assistance other than the determination of facts.²⁰

DE FACTO CORPORATIONS

The decision of the Supreme Court, however, raises a problem of novel impression. The novelty of the problem, as well as of the great interests involved, makes it one of great importance. The problem stems from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, to wit:

"In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative power, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution in 1935, which is utterly incompatible with said statutory enactment."

This judicial declaration of the repeal of section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — the law upon which the President based his power to create the thirty-three municipalities voided by the Supreme Court — has effects reaching further than meets the eye. The Supreme Court in effect ruled that *all* municipalities created by Executive Orders of seven Presidents since 1935 have no corporate existence.²¹ Thus, not only the thirty-three municipalities involved in the prohibition suit are affected but also other progressive municipalities and cities which started their corporate existence as municipalities are likewise affected.

The existence of some three hundred and ten municipalities created since 1935 is a *fait accompli*, but a cloud has been raised relative to their corporate personalities by the pronouncement of the Court. Henceforth, any person dealing with any of these municipalities would have to do so at his own risk. This development may rightly be considered a retrogression in the political life of the country and a great blow to the avowed national effort of giving more local autonomy to local governments. Because of this,

¹⁹ *People v. Lim Ho*, G.R. No. L-12091-2, January 28, 1960; *People v. Jolliffe*, G.R. No. L-9553, May 13, 1959; *People v. Vera*, 65 Phil 56 (1937); *Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission*, 236 U.S. 230 (1915); *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.*, 295 U.S. 495, 79 L ed: 1570 (1935)

²⁰ *People v. Bennett*, 29 Michigan 451, 79 L ed. 553 (1935).

²¹ See appendix for a list of municipalities created by Executive Orders from 1935-1965

an inquiry into the status of these municipalities assumes paramount importance. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code having been declared unconstitutional, may these municipalities be considered municipal corporations *de facto*?

It is a well-established rule of law that before there can be a corporation *de facto*, there must be some authority for a corporation *de jure*.²² Municipal corporations are sole creatures of the law and the warrant of their creation must therefore be found in a valid legislative enactment or they can have no legal existence at all²³

This theory, often referred to as the *ab initio* theory, is based on the proposition that a valid statute is one of the essentials of a corporation *de facto*.²⁴ Corporations can exist only by authority and sanction of law. Thus, where the law under which they pretend to come into existence is unconstitutional, they cannot refer their existence to any law and there being no law, there can be no corporation, no matter how punctiliously they might have complied with the assumed law in their formation.²⁵ "An unconstitutional law is no law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, affords no protection and creates no office and is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed." From this promise is necessarily concluded that an organization under an unconstitutional law is utterly void and therefore may be collaterally attacked.²⁶

It is not the intention of the writers of this paper to refute the soundness of this doctrine. The general proposition that there can be no corporation *de facto* under an unconstitutional statute is no doubt correct, as a statement of a doctrine of law. But to apply this doctrine entirely without qualification would be to cause the mischief sought to be avoided by the *de facto* doctrine — chaos and confusion in the political life of the country, chaos and confusion which staggers the imagination, more so because not one or two or three but 310 municipalities are involved.

Besides there is a doubt as to whether the premise of the proposition that there can be no corporation *de facto* under an uncon-

²² Guthrie v. Wylie, 31 Pac 190 (1892); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 (1886); Town of Winneconne v. Village of Winneconne, 86 NW 589 (1901).

²³ Wilmington v. Addicks, 43 Atl 297 (1899).

²⁴ To constitute a municipal corporation *de facto*, there must be: (a) a valid law authorizing incorporation; (b) an attempt in good faith to organize under it; (c) a colorable compliance with the law, and (d) an assumption of corporate powers. See Cooley, Municipal Corporations, p. 57.

²⁵ State ex. rel Horton v. Brechler, 202 NW 144, 147 (1925); Brandenstein v. Hoke, 35 Pac 562 (1894).

²⁶ Norton v. Shelby County, *supra*.

stitutional statute is true or sufficient.

For one thing, the *ab initio* theory fails to recognize the right of every citizen to accept the law as it is written and not to require him to determine its validity. An unconstitutional law, although no law, cannot be considered as void *ab initio* and until the judicial department of the state has passed upon its validity, it stands in the statute books as valid and as much entitled to be respected and obeyed by citizens as any other law. This is the only way in which a truly republican government can be safely administered. To require every citizen to determine for himself at his peril what extent, if at all, the Legislature has overstepped the boundaries set by the Constitution would be to place upon them an intolerable burden.²⁷

Every law, therefore, passed by the Legislature, however repugnant to the Constitution, has not only the appearance and semblance of authority but the force of law. Public policy requires that such law be respected by citizens until it has received judicial condemnation and the same public policy requires obedience from the citizens of the State to the provisions of a statute which creates a municipality and provides for its government even though unconstitutional.²⁸

Furthermore, the premise of the *ab initio* theory utterly ignores the fact that municipal corporations are created for the public good, that they are not only beneficial but necessary agencies of good government.

The existence of a municipal corporation is not only permitted but is essential to the government which is organized. Their corporate character is not given by the Legislature. That body, if it deems the organization consistent with public policy, prescribes a method of organization in form. This law, whether operative or not, signified the approval of the Legislature of the formation of a municipal corporation and in so far as it was in execution of its authority under the Constitution. An unconstitutional and void law may yet be color of authority to support, as against anybody but the state, a public or private corporation *de facto*, where such corporation is of a kind which is recognized by law and the general system of law in the state.²⁹

It is therefore submitted that there is a stable ground for

²⁷ Lang v. Bayonne, 68 Atl 90 (1907); Speer v. Board of County Commissioners, 88 Fed 49 (1898).

²⁸ Lang v. Bayonne, *supra*.

²⁹ Jameson v. People, 16 Ill 257, cited in Lang v. Bayonne, *supra*; Ashley v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Fed 55, 64 (1893); Speer v. Board, *supra*.

asserting that there can be a corporation *de facto* even under an unconstitutional statute and that the 310 municipalities created since 1935 are corporations *de facto*. In fact, preponderant state court decisions and eminent authorities in the United States have not been in agreement with the *ab initio* theory and have propounded a contrary view. Thus, the early view championed by the federal courts, that there could not be a *de facto* existence under an unconstitutional act because in legal contemplation the act was never operative has been apparently tempered by these later federal, as well as preponderant state court decisions which have given *de facto* effect to good faith attempts to organize municipalities under later declared unconstitutional acts, on the ground that such acts are presumed valid until adjudged repugnant to fundamental law and their existence until declared unconstitutional is an operative fact which cannot be justly ignored.³⁰

According to this view, equity demands that municipal corporations organized under a statute which has the appearance of a valid law be at least considered as corporations *de facto*. We think this to be the better view. This theory is more in accord with the spirit of the times and the advancements of the age. Towns and cities have burgeoned as it were and in a short time have assumed all the privileges and franchise pertaining to and incident to such municipalities and at the same time assumed all the concomitant burdens of taxation for their existence and advancement. To apply the *ab initio* theory might disrupt and disorganize many of the best and prosperous towns and cities of the country.

This later theory is based on the importance of maintaining the stability and assurance of safety in the conduct of government under a legislative enactment. Whether a law is valid and constitutional cannot be known until it is submitted to a judicial decision and it would certainly lead to the wildest confusion to hold that municipal corporations under the provision of a legislative enactment are wholly without authority or sanction where such enactment is ultimately pronounced to be infirm.³¹

Some courts have even extended the limits of this theory. These courts held that by laches and acquiescence in the exercise of corporate powers by a corporation *de facto* and because of the uncertainty and irretrievable confusion into which a judgment of ouster would throw the public and private rights and interests which have been created by the assumption of corporate powers, even the state may be estopped from attacking the validity of the organization

³⁰ Rhyne, *Municipal Law*, (1957), p. 23.

³¹ *Topeka v. Dwyer*, 78 Pac 417 (1904).

even in a direct proceeding for the purpose.³²

Thus, courts have been reluctant to declare an ouster judgment where the corporation *de facto* organized under color of law has exercised without question its corporate powers for a considerable period of time unless it is fully satisfied that an apparently clear case is made out against the organization of the municipal corporation and even then, if in the opinion of the court, the ouster judgment is not required by the interests of the community. Accordingly, courts have indulged in presumptions of legal existence of such municipal corporations if through recognition and acquiescence by the public in general as well as by the state the municipal corporation has been left to assume corporate powers. Individuals cannot therefore be heard to complain where the state itself has acquiesced to the usurpation and has made no complaint.³³

Applying therefore the latter doctrine enunciated by state courts, it cannot then be asserted that section 68 was no "color of law" as will not afford validity to the acts of the Presidents in creating these municipalities. "Color of law" does not mean actual law. The municipalities created pursuant to section 68 were organized under color of law. If it later turned out that said section was void, then we have here pretended corporations usurping a franchise of the state, which is the sole party injured by the usurpation and is alone authorized to question the authority of the municipal corporations thus established. As corporations *de facto*, their existence cannot be collaterally attacked by a private person.

As a consequence of this precedent — setting decision, the Office of the President issued a provincial circular addressed to the municipalities affected by the decision and other municipalities created by former President Macapagal after the filing of the case requiring them to desist from performing the functions of government. This circular, together with the *Pelaez* case, would, at first glance, appear to be a collateral attack on the existence of these municipalities, which under the doctrine enunciated above cannot be done with respect to *de facto* corporations. However, as may be inferred from the decision itself, these municipalities under consideration cannot pretend to be *de facto* corporations. It must be noted that when petitioner instituted his action only two months had elapsed from the time the executive orders in question were

³² State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark 81 (1881); State v. Westport, 22 SW 888 (1893); People v. Harker, 64 NE 253 (1902); State v. Huff 79 SW 1010 (1904); State v. Town of Pell City, 47 So 2446 (1908); People v. Roberts, 139 NE 870 (1923).

³³ Miller v. Ferris Irrigation District 85 Fed 693, 699 (1898).

issued so much so that the officers of said municipalities have not yet been appointed or elected nor assumed office. Neither has the respondent Auditor General acted on any of the executive orders, and, furthermore, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against him restraining him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders. Thus, said municipalities have not yet even begun their corporate existence since under the Revised Administrative Code, a new municipality comes into existence as a separate body corporate only upon qualification of the mayor, the vice-mayor, and a majority of the councilors, unless some other time be fixed therefore by law.³⁴ Said municipalities being legally non-existent, there is therefore no reason for denying collateral attack on the validity of their creation. For how could a non-existent municipality be considered a *de facto* corporation?

The fact that the prohibition suit and the circular were confined merely to the thirty-three municipalities and did not pretend to embrace the two hundred and thirty-four municipalities created by executive orders since 1935 is a recognition of their *de facto* existence.

Since 1935 up to the time the Supreme Court promulgated its decision on December 24, 1965, thirty years had elapsed and bearing in mind the purpose for which municipal corporations are created, it cannot be presumed otherwise that in the interregnum these municipal corporations have not been exercising their powers and privileges as duly constituted municipalities. They have contracted obligations which they are bound to discharge under the laws of the state. They have levied and collected taxes. They have acquired and disposed of property. They have made such improvements and constructions, like roads, bridges, dams, dikes, promotive of the health, welfare and convenience of their inhabitants and have issued bonds or tax bills in payment thereof. The state itself, through legislative acts, has unequivocally recognized them as municipal corporations. To hold all these as null and void would be contrary to public policy and the best interests of the inhabitants of these municipalities.

No useful purpose would be subserved by ending the existence of these municipalities, were we to follow the *ab initio* theory. On the contrary, much mischief might be done. If these municipalities were not legally organized, they should not have been permitted to

³⁴ Section 2168, Revised Administrative Code

use their franchises for so long a period, if the use was detrimental to the welfare of the community, which doubtless was not and would not have been. Every interest of the state such as public peace, security of person and property, and payment of the municipal corporation's debts would be impaired rather than promoted by setting aside their incorporation at this late stage and leaving the citizens of such municipalities without organization, administration or corporate privileges.

Perhaps an even stronger argument in favor of the existence of these municipalities which have been in operation for at least thirty years would be the fact that the state itself has been guilty of laches and should therefore be estopped from asking an ouster judgment against them. While it is of course obvious that the decision in the *Pelaez case* would be controlling as a precedent should on ouster proceeding be brought, said decision must not control the action of the court. Furthermore, we may even apply the doctrine of incorporation by prescription with respect to these municipalities. When no express act of creation may be shown, the existence of a municipal corporation may nevertheless be presumed from the fact that a community has exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, for a period of time long enough to establish prescription; or from acts of the legislature recognizing the existence of a community exercising corporate powers.³⁵ In which case, this would be the first instance that municipal incorporation by prescription would be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Of course, the question whether these municipalities are *de facto* corporations or not would be rendered academic by the passage of a curative or validating act by Congress. On the matter of curative acts validating defective incorporations, it is believed by many that a curative act cannot validate an incorporation which is rendered void by the Constitution. This necessarily proceeds from the *ab initio* theory that there can be no *de facto* corporation under an unconstitutional statute and, therefore, Congress cannot cure or validate something inexistent. The better view, it is submitted, would be that the legislature, having the power to create a municipal corporation, may validate an attempted organization of the municipality, provided the validating statute be enacted in conformity with any constitutional restrictions placed upon the manner in which the incorporation of cities or other municipalities shall

³⁵ *Robie v. Sedgwick*, 35 Barb. (NY) 319; *People v. Farnham*, 36 Ill 562, cited in *Sinco and Cortes*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

be effected. This is simply the application of the principle that it is within the power of the legislature to give force and effect to an act which, but for irregularity, would be valid, provided it could, in advance, have authorized the act to be done. It is not necessary that the legislature should, in express terms, validate the proceedings for incorporation, if the legislature has full powers to create corporations, a statute recognizing a municipal corporation as valid and existing operates to cure all defects leading up to the organization and makes a *de jure* out of what may have been only a *de facto* corporation.³⁶

Pursuant to its plenary power to create municipal corporations, Congress has taken the proper measure to correct the defects in these municipalities created by the President. During the 1966 Session, Congress enacted fourteen remedial measures.³⁷ Creation by special laws would be the only remedy for the municipalities affected by the decision of the Supreme Court because legally they are non-existent and because some of these municipalities may have special needs distinct from the others. However, with respect to those which have been in existence even prior to the promulgation of the decision, it would be best for Congress to pass a general or omnibus bill declaring the incorporation of these municipalities valid. The statesmanship of the members of Congress is not to be doubted but knowing that the power to create municipal corporations is a potent political tool and in the hands of unscrupulous politicians, it is not difficult to see why the piece meal validation of these municipalities would not serve the best interests of the country. Until and unless such act is passed by Congress, it would still be necessary to indulge in the presumption that these municipalities are corporations *de facto*, which is the most favorable, and indeed, the most equitable, presumption one can make under the circumstances.

³⁶ *Commanche County v. Lewis*, 13 U.S. 198 (1890), *Harper County v. Rose*, 14 U.S. 71 (1891).

³⁷ Gloria, Oriental, Rep. Act No. 4651; Sta. Maria, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4741; San Isidro, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4744; Carmen, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4745; New Corella, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4747; Kibiawan, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4748; Kaputian, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4754; Tarragona, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4755; New Bataan, Davao, Rep. Act No. 4756; Lataban, Bukidnon; Rep. Act No. 4787; Kalilangan, Bukidnon Rep. Act No. 4785; Dianaton, Lanao del Sur, Rep. Act No. 4790; Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Rep. Act No. 4800; Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Rep. Act No. 4801.

ANNEX

LIST OF MUNICIPALITIES CREATED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER (1935-1965)

| EXEC. ORDER | Name of Municipality, Province | Date Signed |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. 65 | Buenavista, Agusan | 11-19-36 |
| 2. 56 | Del Gallego, Cam. Sur | 10- 5-36 |
| 3. 159 | Cuartero, Capiz | 8-23-38 |
| 4. 364 | Lezo, Capiz | 8-23-38 |
| 5. 66 | Dulawan, Cotabato | 11-25-36 |
| 6. 66 | Midsayap, Cotabato | 11-25-36 |
| 7. 64 | Malita, Davao | 11-13-36 |
| 8. 64 | Pantukan, Davao | 11-13-36 |
| 9. 352 | Tagum, Davao | 6-27-41 |
| 10. 320 | Anilao, Iloilo | 9- 8-39 |
| 11. 241 | Leganes, Iloilo | 12-23-39 |
| 12. 296 | Nueva Valenciana, Iloilo | 8-12-41 |
| 13. 143 | Tubungan, Iloilo | 3-15-38 |
| 14. 295 | Zarraga, Iloilo | 8-12-40 |
| 15. 181 | Cordon, Isabela | 12-28-39 |
| 16. 37 | Kolambugan, Lanao | 6- 4-36 |
| 17. 242 | Bonifacio, Occ. Mindoro | 12-28-39 |
| 18. 246 | Alubijid, Or. Mindoro | 4-15-40 |
| 19. 185 | Angadanan, Tayabas | 8- 3-39 |
| 20. 152 | Bondo, Tayabas | 4-30-38 |
| 21. 316 | Tagkawayan, Tayabas | -40 |
| 22. 353 | Aurora, Zamboanga | -41 |
| 23. 77 | Kabasalan, Zamboanga | -36 |
| 24. 77 | Margosatubig, Zamboanga | -36 |
| 25. 77 | Sindangan, Zamboanga | -36 |
| 26. 77 | Siocon, Zamboanga | -36 |
| 27. 140 | Agoncillo, Batangas | 5-12-48 |
| 28. 186 | Asia, Negros Occidental | 11-20-48 |
| 29. 139 | Aurora, Isabela | 5-12-48 |
| 30. 152 | Balo, Lanao | 7 -8-48 |
| 31. 80 | Trinidad, Bohol | 8-14-47 |
| 32. 85 | Calamba, Misamis Occ. | 9- 3-47 |
| 33. 19 | Canlaon, Negros Or. | 9- 3-47 |
| 34. 159 | Caramoran, Catanduanes | 8- 7-48 |
| 35. 82 | Buayan, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 36. 82 | Buluang, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 37. 82 | Dinaig, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 38. 82 | Kabakan, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 39. 82 | Kiamba, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 40. 82 | Kidapawan, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 41. 82 | Koronadal, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 42. 82 | Nuling, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 43. 82 | Pagalunyan, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |

| EXEC. ORDER | Name of Municipality, Province | Date Signed |
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| 44. 82 | Pasung, Cotabato | 8-18-47 |
| 45. 195 | Lebak, Cotabato | 12-31-48 |
| 46. 156 | Trinidad, Davao | 7- 9-48 |
| 47. 156 | Compostela, Davao | 7- 9-48 |
| 48. 156 | Gov. Generoso, Davao | 7- 9-48 |
| 49. 156 | New Leyte, Davao | 7- 9-48 |
| 50. 151 | Kapalong, Davao | 7- 8-48 |
| 51. 151 | Lupon, Davao | 7- 8-48 |
| 52. 151 | Samal, Davao | 7- 8-48 |
| 53. 165 | Jasaan, Misamis Or. | 8-15-48 |
| 54. 126 | Kauswagan, Lanao | 3-29-48 |
| 55. 72 | Pugo, La Union | 7-31-47 |
| 56. 72 | Sudipen, La Union | 7-31-47 |
| 57. 72 | San Gabriel, La Union | 7-31-47 |
| 58. 79 | Labason, Zamboanga | 8-12-47 |
| 59. 162 | Almeira, Leyte | 8-12-48 |
| 60. 128 | Linugos, Misamis Or. | 4-21-48 |
| 61. 122 | Mahinog, Misamis Or. | 3-19-48 |
| 62. 129 | Medina, Misamis Or. | 3-19-48 |
| 63. 181 | Roxas, Mindoro | 4-21-48 |
| 64. 185 | Sipalay, Negros Occ. | 11-20-48 |
| 65. 141 | Taboso, Negros Occ. | 5-19-48 |
| 66. 111 | Sta. Catalina, Negros Or. | 12-17-47 |
| 67. 113 | Talugtug, Nueva Ecija | 12-20-47 |
| 68. 140 | Pansipit, Batangas | 5-12-48 |
| 69. 2 | Pinadacdae, Samar | 7- 8-48 |
| 70. 298 | San Isidro, Samar | 1- 5-54 |
| 71. 253 | Anini-u, Antique | 8- 5-49 |
| 72. 3 | Hamtic, Antique | 11- 5-54 |
| 73. 253 | Libertad, Antique | 8- 5-49 |
| 74. 279 | Padre Garcia, Batangas | 10-11-49 |
| 75. 265 | Alicia, Bohol | 9-16-49 |
| 76. 204 | Borja, Bohol | 2- 7-49 |
| 77. 184 | Dagohoy, Bohol | 6-21-56 |
| 78. 289 | Sta. Ana, Cagayan | 10-21-49 |
| 79. 485 | Balata, Cam. Sur. | 12- 3-51 |
| 80. 251 | Bombon, Cam. Sur | 7-27-49 |
| 81. 205 | Underson, Cam. Sur | 3- 4-49 |
| 82. 243 | Ocampo, Cam. Sur | 7-15-49 |
| 83. 503 | San Miguel, Catanduanes | 5-27-52 |
| 84. 621 | Tabuelan, Cebu | 9-23-53 |
| 85. 612 | Banga, Cotabato | 9-11-53 |
| 86. 214 | Carmen, Cotabato | 11-15-56 |
| 87. 250 | Clan, Cotabato | 2-27-49 |
| 88. 266 | Isulan, Cotabato | 8-30-57 |
| 89. 243 | Lambayong, Cotabato | 10-29-52 |
| 90. 63 | Makilala, Cotabato | 9- 8-54 |
| 91. 462 | Malang, Cotabato | 8- 3-51 |

| EXEC. ORDER | Name of Municipality, Province | Date Signed |
|-------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| 92. 572 | Morala, Cotabato | 3-10-53 |
| 93. 622 | Pigkawayan, Cotabato | 9-30-53 |
| 94. 270 | Pikit, Cotabato | 9-29-49 |
| 95. 264 | Palomolok, Cotabato | 8-21-57 |
| 96. 462 | Tacurong, Cotabato | 8- 3-51 |
| 97. 227 | Tumbao, Cotabato | 6-16-49 |
| 98. 612 | Tupi, Cotabato | 9-11-53 |
| 99. 596 | Babak, Davao | 5-28-53 |
| 100. 506 | Bansalan, Davao | 6- 6-52 |
| 101. 236 | Digos, Davao | 7- 1-49 |
| 102. 596 | Hagonoy, Davao | 5-28-53 |
| 103. 65 | Monkayo, Davao | 9-14-54 |
| 104. 236 | Padada, Davao | 9-14-54 |
| 105. 596 | Dña. Alicia, Davao | 5-28-53 |
| 106. 596 | Malalag, Davao | 5-28-53 |
| 107. 236 | Panaba, Davao | 7- 1-49 |
| 108. 254 | Batad, Iloilo | 8- 5-49 |
| 109. 259 | San Enrique, Iloilo | 7-12-57 |
| 110. 268 | Alicia, Isabela | 9-28-49 |
| 111. 293 | Cabatuan, Isabela | 11- 5-49 |
| 112. 269 | San Agustin, Isabela | 9-28-49 |
| 113. 199 | Sto. Tomas, Isabela | 1- 5-49 |
| 114. 282 | Victoria, Laguna | 10-14-49 |
| 115. 222 | Baroy, Lanao | 6-10-49 |
| 116. 588 | Karomatan, Lanao | 4-30-53 |
| 117. 208 | Lala, Lanao | 3-22-49 |
| 118. 271 | Cabuogayan, Leyte | 9-29-49 |
| 119. 630 | Calaba, Leyte | 10-16-53 |
| 120. 278 | Julita, Leyte | 10-10-49 |
| 121. 324 | MacArthur, Leyte | 6-17-50 |
| 122. 265 | Padre Burgos, Leyte | 8-29-57 |
| 123. 84 | Saint Bernard, Leyte | 12- 9-54 |
| 124. 292 | San Francisco, Leyte | 11- 1-49 |
| 125. 277 | Sta. Fe, Leyte | 10-10-49 |
| 126. 326 | Silago, Leyte | 6-20-50 |
| 127. 284 | Tabango, Leyte | 10-15-49 |
| 128. 631 | Tabontabon, Leyte | 10-17-53 |
| 129. 266 | Tunga, Leyte | 9-24-49 |
| 130. 244 | Baleno, Masbate | 9-18-49 |
| 131. 244 | Balud, Masbate | 9-18-49 |
| 132. 244 | Cawayan, Masbate | 9-18-49 |
| 133. 244 | Mandaon, Masbate | 9-18-49 |
| 134. 244 | Mobo, Masbate | 9-18-49 |
| 135. 238 | Monreal, Masbate | 2-13-57 |
| 136. 244 | Uson, Masbate | 7-18-49 |
| 137. 261 | Sapang Dalaga, Mis. Occ. | 8-12-57 |
| 138. 258 | Sinacaban, Mis. Occ. | 8-30-49 |

| EXEC. ORDER | Name of Municipality. Province | Date Signed |
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| 139. 490 | Balingoan, Mis. Or. | 2-12-52 |
| 140. 322 | Guinsiliban, Mis. Or. | 6-13-50 |
| 141. 234 | Lagonglong, Mis. Or. | 7- 1-49 |
| 142. 203 | Manticao, Mis. Or. | 2- 7-49 |
| 143. 186 | Asia, Negros Occ. | 11-20-48 |
| 144. 185 | Sipalay, Negros Occ. | 11-20-48 |
| 145. 228 | Payabon, Negros Or. | 6-17-49 |
| 146. 210 | Sta. Cruz, Mindoro | 10-15-49 |
| 147. 620 | SSta. Cru, Mindoro | |
| 148. 620 | Victoria, Or. Mindoro | 9-18-53 |
| 149. 476 | Sto. Tomas, Pampanga | 10-12-51 |
| 150. 375 | Dipaculao, Quezon | 11-27-50 |
| 151. 246 | Maria Aurora, Quezon | 7-21-49 |
| 152. 246 | Gen. Nakar, Quezon | 7-21-49 |
| 153. 270 | San Antonio, Quezon | 10- 4-57 |
| 154. 262 | Daram, Samar | 9- 1-49 |
| 155. 255 | Giporlas, Samar | 8-19-49 |
| 156. 238 | Las Navas, Samar | 7- 8-49 |
| 157. 247 | Marabut, Samar | 7-22-49 |
| 158. 249 | Anao-aon, Surigao | 5-24-57 |
| 159. 559 | Cagwait, Surigao | 1-20-53 |
| 160. 126 | Claver, Surigao | 9-13-53 |
| 161. 624 | Cortez, Surigao | 10- 1-53 |
| 162. 561 | Madrid, Surigao | 2- 2-53 |
| 163. 195 | Malimono, Surigao | 7-31-56 |
| 164. 445 | Oteiza, Surigao | 6- 6-51 |
| 165. 638 | Pilar, Surigao | 10-31-53 |
| 166. 623 | Sugono, Surigao | 10- 1-53 |
| 167. 269 | Tubod, Surigao | 9-18-57 |
| 168. 469 | Lilay, Zamboanga | 8-22-51 |
| 169. 467 | New Piñan, Zamboanga | 8-22-51 |
| 170. 365 | Rizal, Zamboanga | 12-21-50 |
| 171. 468 | Alicia, Zamboanga | 8-22-51 |
| 172. 362 | Dinas, Zamboanga | 11- 9-50 |
| 173. 249 | Ipil, Zamboanga | 7-26-49 |
| 174. 245 | Labangan, Zamboanga | 7-20-49 |
| 175. 273 | Lapluyan, Zamboanga del Sur | 10-16-57 |
| 176. 239 | Liangao, Zamboanga del Sur | 2-13-57 |
| 177. 274 | Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur | 11-16-57 |
| 178. 268 | San Pablo, Zamboanga del Sur | 9-17-57 |
| 179. 223 | Siay, Zamboanga del Sur | 12-28-56 |
| 180. 295 | Sulop, Davao | 4-24-58 |
| 181. 308 | Mahaplag, Leyte | 7-21-58 |
| 182. 314 | Candona, Negros Occ. | 8-22-58 |
| 183. 283 | Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur | 12-27-57 |
| 184. 282 | Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur | 12-27-57 |
| 185. 283 | Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur | 11-29-58 |

| EXEC. ORDER | Name of Municipality, Province | Date Signed |
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| 186. 331 | Maigo, Lanao | 2-27-59 |
| 187. 362 | Buenavista, Bohol | 10-26-59 |
| 188. 344 | Sibutud, Zamb. del Norte | 7- 9-59 |
| 189. 360 | Valencia, Bukidnon | 10-11-59 |
| 190. 350 | Palimbang, Cotabato | 8-14-59 |
| 191. 351 | Mawale, Davao | 8-14-59 |
| 192. 352 | Santo Tomas, Davao | 8-14-59 |
| 193. 359 | San Isidro, Surigao | 10- 9-59 |
| 194. 357 | Sison, Surigao | 9-15-59 |
| 195. 356 | Kumalarang, Zamb. del Sur | 8-28-59 |
| 196. 366 | Olongapo, Zambales | 12- 7-59 |
| 197. 367 | Cagdianao, Surigao | 12-23-59 |
| 198. 371 | Linamon, Lanao del Norte | 1-13-60 |
| 199. 370 | Salvador, Lanao del Norte | 1-13-60 |
| 200. 386 | Balabagan, Lanao del Sur | 3-15-60 |
| 201. 381 | Albor, Surigao | 2-29-60 |
| 202. 380 | Bung, Zamb. del Sur | 2-26-60 |
| 203. 389 | Magsaysay, Lanao del Norte | 3-22-60 |
| 204. 393 | Mahayag, Zamb. del Sur | 7-14-60 |
| 205. 395 | Tungawan, Zamb. del Sur | 5-24-60 |
| 206. 400 | San Miguel, Zamb. del Sur | 7-14-60 |
| 207. 401 | Valenzuela, Bulacan | 7-21-60 |
| 208. 402 | Mutia, Zamb. del Norte | 7-22-60 |
| 209. 407 | Barobo, Surigao del Sur | 10-24-60 |
| 210. 410 | Real, Quezon | 12-15-60 |
| 211. 414 | Libungan, Cotabato | 1-26-61 |
| 212. 415 | Tanlaingan, Cotabato | 1-27-61 |
| 213. 419 | Socorro, Surigao del Norte | 2-22-61 |
| 214. 421 | Balison, Antique | 3-10-61 |
| 215. 422 | Danao, Bohol | 3-14-61 |
| 216. 423 | San Miguel, Bohol | 3-14-61 |
| 217. 425 | Lugait, Mis. Or. | 3-16-61 |
| 218. 427 | Alcantara, Romblon | 3-21-61 |
| 219. 430 | Citagum, Mis. Or. | 6- 8-61 |
| 220. 431 | Piagapo, Lanao del Sur | 6- 9-61 |
| 221. 436 | Lawigan, Iloilo | 7-10-61 |
| 222. 440 | Bayugan, Agusan | 8- 6-61 |
| 223. 439 | Columbio, Cotabato | 8- 6-61 |
| 224. 441 | Tulunán, Cotabato | 8- 6-61 |
| 225. 442 | Kitcharao, Agusan | 8-16-61 |
| 226. 443 | Tabina, Zamb. del Sur | 8-16-61 |
| 227. 444 | Dangcagan, Bukidnon | 8-29-61 |
| 228. 446 | Basista, Pangasinan | 9- 5-61 |
| 229. 452 | Bayabas, Surigao del Sur | 11-20-61 |
| 230. 454 | Sta. Teresita, Batangas | 11-28-61 |
| 231. 463 | Pilar, Bohol | 12-29-61 |
| 232. 459 | Kalamansig, Cotabato | 12-29-61 |

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| 233. | 461 | Batalam, Cotabato | 12-29-61 |
| 234. | 47 | Batalam, Cotabato | 9-11-63 |
| 235. | 93 | Nilo, Zamb. del Sur | 9- 4-64 |
| 236. | 94 | Midsalip, Zamb. del Sur | 9- 4-64 |
| 237. | 95 | Pitogo, Zamb. del Sur | 9- 4-64 |
| 238. | 96 | Maruing, Zamb. del Sur | 9- 4-64 |
| 239. | 97 | Naga, Zamb. del Sur | 9- 4-64 |
| 240. | 99 | Sebaste, Antique | 9-26-64 |
| 241. | 100 | Malugan, Misamis Or. | 9-26-64 |
| 242. | 101 | Malixi, Surigao del Sur | 9-28-64 |
| 243. | 102 | Roxas, Davao | 9-28-64 |
| 244. | 103 | Magsaysay, Davao | 9-28-64 |
| 245. | 104 | Sta. Maria, Davao | 9-28-64 |
| 246. | 105 | Badiangan, Iloilo | 9-28-64 |
| 247. | 106 | Mina, Iloilo | 10- 1-64 |
| 248. | 107 | Andong, Lanao del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 249. | 108 | Sultan Alonto, Lanao del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 250. | 109 | Maguin, Lanao del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 251. | 110 | Dianaton, Lanao del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 252. | 111 | Quirino, Mt. Province | 10- 1-64 |
| 253. | 112 | Bayog, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 254. | 113 | Maasim, Cotabato | 10- 1-64 |
| 255. | 114 | Siayan, Zamb. del Norte | 10- 1-64 |
| 256. | 115 | Roxas, Zamb. del Norte | 10- 1-64 |
| 257. | 116 | Paganuran, Zamb. del Norte | 10- 1-64 |
| 258. | 117 | Gloria, Or. Mindoro | 10- 1-64 |
| 259. | 118 | Kalilangan, Bukidnon | 10- 1-64 |
| 260. | 119 | Lantapan, Bukidnon | 10- 1-64 |
| 261. | 120 | Libertan, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 262. | 121 | Gen. Aguinaldo, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 1-64 |
| 263. | 124 | Rizal, Surigao del Norte | 10- 3-64 |
| 264. | 126 | Tigao, Surigao del Sur | 10-23-64 |
| 265. | 127 | Tampakan, Cotabato | 10-26-64 |
| 266. | 128 | Maco, Davao | 10-29-60 |
| 267. | 129 | New Corella, Davao | 10-29-60 |
| 268. | 143 | Kiblawan, Davao | 3- 5-65 |
| 269. | 161 | Don Carlos, Bukidnon | 8-17-65 |
| 270. | 170 | Santiago, Southern Leyte | 9-10-65 |
| 271. | 175 | Pandami & Laminusa, Sulu | 10-14-65 |
| 272. | 176 | Mabuhay, Zamboanga del Sur | 10- 9-65 |
| 273. | 177 | Cabatan, Zamboanga del Sur | 10- 9-65 |
| 274. | 178 | Surabay, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 9-65 |
| 275. | 179 | Ditay, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 9-65 |
| 276. | 180 | Diplahan, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 9-65 |
| 277. | 181 | Bawang, Zamb. del Sur | 10- 9-65 |
| 278. | 182 | San Isidro, Davao | 10- 9-65 |
| 279. | 183 | Tarragona, Davao | 10- 9-65 |

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| 280. | 184 | Kaputian, Davao | 10- 9-65 |
| 281. | 185 | Lourdes, Or. Mindoro | 10-14-65 |
| 282. | 187 | Bagumbayan, Cotabato | 10-24-65 |
| 283. | 188 | New Bataan, Davao | 11- 2-65 |
| 284. | 189 | Carmen, Davao | 11- 2-65 |
| 285. | 193 | Limasawa, Southern Leyte | 10-24-65 |
| 286. | 194 | San Ricardo, Southern Leyte | 10-24-65 |
| 287. | 196 | Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur | 11-17-65 |
| 288. | 197 | Carmen, Surigao del Sur | 11-17-65 |
| 289. | 198 | Kitaotao, Bukidnon | 11-18-65 |
| 290. | 199 | Pulangi, Bukidnon | 11-18-65 |
| 291. | 201 | Eva, Bohol | 11-18-65 |
| 292. | 202 | Kabanglasan & Tikalaan, Bukidnon | 11-18-65 |
| 293. | 203 | P. Dupaya, Cagayan | 11-20-65 |
| 294. | 205 | Tamblot, Bohol | 11-22-65 |
| 295. | 207 | Alegria, Surigao del Norte | 11-22-65 |
| 296. | 209 | Quirino, Quezon | 11-26-65 |
| 297. | 211 | Burgos, Sur. del Norte | 11-29-65 |
| 298. | 211-a | Tuloadao, Lanao del Sur | 11-29-65 |
| 299. | 211-b | New Bad-as, Surigao del Norte | 11-29-65 |
| 300. | 211-d | Bayanihan, Zamb. del Norte | 11-29-65 |
| 301. | 211-e | Kulaman, Cotabato | 11-29-65 |
| 302. | 211-f | Quirino, La Union | 11-29-65 |
| 303. | 212 | Quirino, Isabela | 12- 3-65 |
| 304. | 213 | Baclaran, Rizal | 12- 3-65 |
| 305. | 214 | San Isidro, Bohol | 12- 3-65 |
| 306. | 221 | Tagoloan, Lanao del Sur | 12- 8-65 |
| 307. | 222 | San Miguel, Occ. Mindoro | 12- 8-65 |
| 308. | 223 | Buribid, Lanao del Sur | 12- 8-65 |
| 309. | 224 | Bayuyungan, Batangas | 12- 8-65 |
| 310. | 227 | Tumagabok, Marinduque | 12-20-65 |

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The undersigned, IRENE R. CORTES, editor of the **Philippine Law Journal** (title of publication), published five times a year (frequency of issue), in English (language in which printed), at the College of Law, University of the Philippines (office of publication), after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby submits the following statement of ownership, management, circulation, etc., which is required by Act No. 2580, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 201:

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| Business Manager: CARLOS A. BARRIOS | U.P., Diliman, Quezon City |
| Owner: College of Law, U.P. | College of Law, U.P. Diliman, Quezon City |
| Publisher: College of Law, U.P. | College of Law, U.P. Diliman, Quezon City |
| Printer: VERTEX PRESS, INC. | 43 Quezon Blvd. Ext., Q. C. |
| Office of Publication: | College of Law, U.P. Diliman, Quezon City |

If the publication is owned by a corporation, stockholders, owning one per cent or more of the total amount of stocks: none

Bondholders, mortgages, or other security holders owning one per cent or more of the total amount of security: none

In case of publication other than daily, total number of copies printed and circulated of the last issue, April, 1966:

| | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Sent to paid subscribers | 530 |
| 2. Sent to others than paid subscribers | 230 |
| Total | 760 |

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Doc. No. 284; Page No. 58
Book No. I; Series of 1966.

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