

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT

David Wise and Thomas B. Ross,
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There are, say the authors, two governments in the United States today. One is visible; it is the government that functions openly and whose activities are reported daily in the various media of information. The other is invisible; it gathers intelligence, conducts espionage, and plans and executes secret operations all over the globe. In other words, the invisible government is the cloak and dagger arm of the United States. It represents a drastic change in American values—a complete turnabout from that day in 1939 when Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson closed his department's code-breaking section with the explanation: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

We are told that the heart of the invisible government is the Central Intelligence Agency—the CIA. Its other principal organs are the National Security Council, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The invisible government also includes many other units, agencies and individuals that appear part of the visible government. It even includes business firms and institutions that appear to be private.

The activities of the invisible government are secret. And so the authors ask: "To what extent is this secret government compatible with the American system, or necessary to preserve it? Will it gradually change the character of the institutions it seeks to preserve?"

The book tells of some of the invisible government's operations. It starts with the Bay of Pigs invasion, giving full details of the secret preparations and the failure of the operation because of insufficient air support. This came about because President Kennedy refused to use American armed forces in Cuba although in the end he authorized unmarked U.S. Navy jets to fly over the Bay of Pigs for one hour. The jets did fly but at the wrong time because of lack of coordination between the CIA and the Navy in giving their orders and of confusion over time zones. Incidentally, the Bay of Pigs project was first conceived as a guerilla operation. The training base was commanded by a "Colonel Vallejo" (Colonel Va-

leriano?) said to be "a high ex-Philippine Army officer who had fought the Huks." Later the CIA shifted to a larger amphibious landing and "Colonel Vallejo" was replaced.

The thing that impresses the scrupulous about the Bay of Pigs is that although the American invisible government was the one that planned, financed and directed the entire operation, the visible government denied American involvement. In fact, the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon disclaimed knowledge of the invasion even as it was actually going on. "All we know about Cuba," said Pierre Salinger, "is what we read on the wire services."

The activities of the CIA have taken place in many parts of the world. Some of them are:

Bogota, 1948, where the CIA predicted trouble from Communists and in fact riotings did take place during the Ninth Inter-American Conference which greatly embarrassed Secretary Marshall, head of the American delegation. The State Department later denied that it had received warnings from the CIA.

Korea, 1950, where the CIA predicted a little too late the Chinese Communist entry in the war thus causing MacArthur to launch his home-by-Christmas offensive which failed.

Red China, 1962, where the CIA air-dropped two American agents who were captured and are still in prison. One of the agents has admitted connection with the CIA but Washington has stuck to its story that the two were civilians employed by the U.S. Army who were captured when their transport plane was lost on a flight from Seoul to Japan.

Formosa, where the CIA worked under the cover of Western Enterprise, Inc. but everybody seemed to have known that the company was just a cover. Later, the CIA changed its name to Department of Navy. One of the CIA's chief activities in Taiwan is to train, equip and finance Chinese commando raids on the mainland.

Iran, 1953, where the CIA helped the Shah depose Mossadegh, the weeping premier. In an Associated Press report detailed New York (*Manila Times*, Oct. 13, 1964), Princess Soraya, former Empress of Iran, is reported to have said in her autobiography that an American named Schwarzkopf spent more than \$6 million to swing the business community of Teheran behind the Shah.

Cairo, 1955, where an assistant director of the CIA saw Nasser ahead of an American Secretary of State who made a special trip to Egypt bringing a letter from Dulles warning Nasser not to buy arms from the Communists. This caused a report, without basis

as it turned out, that the CIA official had undercut the official foreign policy of the United States.

Suez, 1956, where the CIA failed to predict the seizure of the canal by Nasser even after America had withdrawn its offer to build the Aswan high dam. This according to Secretary Dulles, but denied by CIA Director Allen Dulles.

Costa Rica, 1956, where the CIA sought to promote the ouster of President Jose Figueras because he had scrupulously recognized the right of asylum for non-Communists and Communists alike. The CIA's strategy was to stir up trouble within the Communist Party in Costa Rica and link Figueras to the Communists.

Yugoslavia, 1956, where the CIA was able to obtain a copy of Khrushchev's historic speech attacking Stalin's crimes at the 20th Communist Party Congress in Moscow.

Turkey, 1960, where U-2 planes took off for their Russian overflights. When the plane which Francis Gary Powers piloted was shot down, Washington gave crude excuses to cover its mission only to admit later that Powers was in fact a spy. Later President Eisenhower justified U-2 overflights as an act of self-defense.

Germany, where the CIA spent millions of dollars for an intelligence set-up headed by an ex-Nazi general, Reinhard Gehlen. Unfortunately, however, the Gehlen apparatus was penetrated by Soviet intelligence. Three Gehlen agents were caught selling secret materials and they confessed later that they had been doing it for over 10 years.

Burma, where the CIA supported a band of 12,000 Nationalist Chinese troops squatting on Burmese territory. The American Ambassador to Burma was not aware, to his chagrin, of the support. In fact even Robert Amory, former Harvard Law School professor and deputy director of the CIA for intelligence, had no knowledge of the operation.

Indonesia, where the CIA supported the 1958 rebellion against President Sukarno. It is not necessary to spell out here why America has no love for Sukarno. In its involvement in Indonesia, the CIA used the Philippines as a base of operations.

Laos and Vietnam, where the CIA makes and unmakes presidents. Incidentally, the CIA hand has not left the Philippines untouched. "Edward Landsdale, an Air Force colonel (now brigadier general) . . . had been a key figure in the CIA-directed operation in support of Magsaysay."

Guatemala, where the CIA managed the coup against the Communist-dominated regime of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. This coup involved Nicaragua which acted as "buyer" for planes furnished by the United States to the Guatemala rebels.

The rest of the book is devoted to describing the shake-up of the CIA by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco; the secret elite who run the American invisible government; the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia; the CIA's inner workings; the search for means to effectively control the activities of the CIA; keeping CIA away from the Peace Corps; the ransom of the Cuban rebels; the Cuban missile crisis; and the CIA's facilities for gathering information.

The Invisible Government is a fascinating book to read. It is also a disburbing book for it reveals that aside from its legitimate pursuit of spying, the United States does meddle in the internal affairs of other states contrary to well-established principles of International Law. To sum it up, things are not always what they seem and it is best to have a healthy attitude of skepticism.

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