

THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE CITY OF MANILA

By EDWIN C. JAMISON, LL. B., 1913.

The best form of government for the city of Manila would take into account the degree of civic advancement of the people of the city; the fact that the people are more or less familiar and fairly well satisfied with the present form and that good government is the product of steady growth and development rather than a sudden metamorphosis. In short, it should be on practical rather than Utopian lines.

At the outset the proper significance of the form, as such, of municipal government should be determined. One of the characteristics of the American is his faith in machinery. His industrial conquests have been made possible by the development of machines and his faith in physical machinery has, not unnaturally, been extended to governmental machinery. He is inclined to believe that for every governmental defect there is a device for correcting that defect. In a word, he believes it possible to construct a self-operating governmental machine. The fallacy is analogous to that of perpetual motion in the physical world. The truth is that a good form of government is only an aid to good government. A city may be excellently governed though having a very poor form of government. Witness the city of London.

Territorially London consists of three distinct areas: First, the old walled city of London in the very heart of the present metropolis and having a population of about 30,000; second, the County of London including the old City of London together with the extra-mural boroughs; and third, the Metropolitan Police District, including the County of London and many suburban towns, the whole having a population of more than 7,000,000. The old city of London still has its charter dating back to the time of Alfred the Great. The extra-mural boroughs have each a large measure of local self-government administered by a local body known as the vestry. Over the entire County of London, the County Council has general authority, while the London police has jurisdiction over the entire Metropolitan Police District. The resulting complexity of the government of the City of London is made sufficiently manifest by a statement of the fact that the administration of the city affairs is in the hands of more than two hundred distinct boards, councils, commissions and other governmental agencies. Yet despite this bewildering complexity London is well governed.

On the other hand, the form of a city government may be never so excellent, yet if the city officials are dishonest or inefficient the actual government of the city is bound to be unsatisfactory. Roses do not grow from thistles.

The factor which ultimately determines the quality of a city's government is the civic virtue, intelligence and alertness of its people, and not the form of government. While, as we shall see later, the form of government may embody devices to foster civic alertness on the part of the people, yet those devices must receive the constant and watchful attention of her public spirited men. The chambers of commerce, the city club, the newspapers and other organs of the civic body must properly perform their functions as leaders of popular thought and action. If these non-official organs fail in their duty in this respect, any device that may be incorporated in the form of government to encourage civic interest in the people will simply fall into "innocuous disuetude" or be perverted by administrative officers who fail to grasp the true spirit of the device or lack the skill to keep it in proper adjustment for the accomplishment of its purpose.

That this is true is due to the nature of the problem of municipal government, which is conceived to be immediately an administrative problem but ultimately a political problem. The problem of municipal government reduced to its lowest terms is to formulate the conventions adopted tacitly or otherwise by the people for their mutual convenience and welfare under the conditions of city life, and to construct and operate the necessary governmental machinery to carry those conventions into effect. Viewed in this light the problem is basically a political one. It is evident that there can be no popular conventions without united action on the part of the populace. No set of municipal officials can interpret the will of the people and translate that will into ordinances and provide frictionless machinery for carrying the popular will into effect unless that popular will can impress itself promptly and effectually upon the municipal government. It is only through the individual effort of citizens of leisure and civic virtue and the united effort of non-official organizations together with the powerful influence of the press, that popular interest in municipal matters may be aroused and maintained, and, in part, expressed.

While it is thus seen that the problem of municipal government is ultimately a political one, it must be born in mind that the field of municipal politics is, as compared with that of state politics, very limited. In municipal politics no question involving the civil rights or personal liberty of the individual is likely to arise since those rights and liberties are guaranteed by the organic law of the state. The problems with which the city is chiefly concerned are those which arise from the concentration of population. Yet the physical problems of sanitation, transportation, lighting, housing, water and gas supply thus arising, by no means cover the field of activity of the modern municipal government. European cities are far in advance of American cities in the recognition of their responsibility for the moral, ethical and social well-being of their citizens.

Man is the product of his environment. The city man's environment is made for him by the community. The city cannot escape this responsibility. Who can doubt that the fundamentally correct way to combat the evils of the dance-hall, the cockpit and the saloon is to construct wide and beautiful streets, keep them clean and inviting, line them with buildings of noble and elevating architecture, with open spaces and parks interspersed among them? How much less inviting, as compared to the open air, would the interior of the vice dens then become! In a short time, under the influence of proper environment, the Filipino workman of Manila would be found adopting the custom of his American and European brothers of spending Sunday with his family in the park, instead of with his cock at the pit. The form of Manila's government should be such as to enable the city to effectually assume the responsibility for the social, ethical, and moral as well as for the physical well-being of the population.

One of the first as well as one of the most difficult questions to arise in the consideration of our subject, is the proper relation of the city to the insular government. To what extent should the insular government control the destiny of the city of Manila? What rights does the fact that the city of Manila is the capital city give to the insular government? It is evident that we can get no assistance in the solution of this problem from a study of the relation of the federal government to that of the city of Washington, D. C. The American capital city was planned and built with one sole object in view, viz., to provide a home for the federal government. Washington has practically no industries, shipping, nor commerce, either foreign or domestic. The city being primarily for the purpose of the federal government, it is logical and right that the federal government should have entire control. The conditions in Manila are entirely different. Here we have a large and growing population engaged in various industries and in commerce, which are in no direct way dependent upon the insular government. In short, Manila is, because of her situation on Manila Bay at the mouth of the Pasig and at the natural outlet of the great central plain of Luzon, the metropolis of the Philippines. The fact of being the insular capital is purely incidental and in no sense essential to her continued existence as the metropolis.

An examination of the relation of the governments of Paris and Berlin to their respective national governments shows that relation to be the outgrowth of peculiar conditions and past political experiences which have no parallel in the Philippines. Hence we can get no practical assistance from these sources.

A study of the history and location of London develops some marked analogies to Manila. Both are situated on short rivers at the natural outlet for the products of a rich agricultural region. Both have superb harbors. The North Sea is to London what Manila Bay is to Manila. London overshadows all other British cities in wealth, population, industries and commerce just as Manila overshadows all other Philippine cities. It would seem, then, that a study of the relation of the

London city government to that of the nation should prove helpful to us in our inquiry as to the proper relation between city and Insular governments, but before taking up directly this phase of the inquiry, a glance at the subject of British municipal government in its broader aspect will lead to a better understanding of our problem.

Professor Usher, in the number for October, 1914, of the National Geographical Magazine points out that the United Kingdom is the oldest nation in Europe. The geographical position of the British Isles has secured for the nation an opportunity to develop rationally and logically during the last eight centuries. The British government of today is simply that of 1087 improved and perfected to keep pace with the development of modern civilization, whereas the present French government is based on entirely different principles than those of prerevolution times, and the present governments of Germany and Italy date back less than one century. In view of the facts thus pointed out and in view of the further fact that the tendency of the Filipinos, as indicated in the Malolos Constitution and other documents of the revolutionary period, is toward a form of government similar to that of the United Kingdom in that legislative supremacy is a cardinal feature thereof, it would seem that the conclusions which England has reached on the matter of the proper relation between the national and municipal governments should be of special value in the present inquiry.

The most striking and essential feature of the English conclusion in this matter is that the responsibility and initiative in municipal government lies with the people of each municipality, which initiative is effectively supervised by the national government. This supervision is exercised through five agencies, viz., the Local Government Board, the Board of Education, the Board of Agriculture, the Home Office, and the Board of Trade, the most important of which for our present purpose, is the Local Government Board.

The chief function of the Board of Trade is to supervise municipal commercial enterprises and municipal ownership of public utilities. The Home Office is chiefly concerned with the supervision of local police bodies. This supervision is in recognition of the paramount interest of the national government in the observance of national laws. The Board of Agriculture supervises the local execution of national laws regarding animal diseases, insect destruction and the preservation of fisheries. The Board of Education inspects schools receiving government aid and lays down the rules for securing such aid.

While these agencies of the national government supervise the activities of the municipalities in the manner just stated and have during the course of many years gathered a vast amount of reliable data covering the field of their respective activities and are therefore in a position to give expert advice to the municipalities and to exercise a highly intelligent supervision over them, yet it is with the Local Government Board that the municipalities come into the closest and most constant contact.

The powers of this board may be classified as legislative, administrative, and financial. Under its legislative power the Board issues orders making effective the national laws regarding poor relief and the public health. The public health orders regulate such matters as milk inspection and the prevention of epidemics. The Local Board, with parliamentary approval, adjusts municipal boundaries and may amend or veto such municipal ordinances as are inconsistent with existing law. Administratively the Board supervises the work of poor relief and the preservation of public health and acts as the go-between to both the local authorities and parliament. The financial duties of the Board consist in passing upon the borrowing projects of the municipalities and in making a final audit of their accounts.

It will be seen that the relation between the national and municipal governments is based on the theory that the intervention of the national government should be limited to a supervision over matters of more or less immediate national concern, leaving the initiative of the local government entirely untrammelled. The application of this theory to the government of the vast city of London has resulted in a most unique municipal government. While the great multitude of boards, commissions and other governing bodies characteristic of the London government is antiquated and unscientific, yet the division of powers between that government as a whole and the national government is instructive. In police matters we find the European practice prevailing, i. e., the London police are essentially a national body. The maintenance of peace and order and the preservation of respect for the law is deemed a matter of paramount national concern. Yet the British public is so thoroughly and militantly democratic that one seldom, if ever, sees that needless and arbitrary disregard, on the part of the police, for the preferences of the individual citizen, so common on the continent. In matters of local concern the city government is practically free to act, subject to the approval, in a proper case, by the national government. The local authorities have control over fire prevention; the construction, extension, cleaning and sprinkling of streets; bridge construction and housing; water supply; electric lighting; parks; schools, and the issuance of licenses. In addition to these powers more or less common to all modern municipal government, the London County Council controls matters of sanitation, subject to such supervision as the Local Government Board sees fit to exercise. The city also operated tramways and a line of steam boats on the Thames River. The city is also free to levy and collect municipal taxes and to make special assessments to cover the cost of improvements. The city may borrow money to any amount, with the approval of the Local Government Board. It will thus be seen that the municipal government of London is fully empowered to promote the best interests of the great community.

If the experience of London and other English and American cities may be said to have established any single principle of Municipal government it is that the city must be free from interference by the state legislature. The city of Manila

then should be free to work out her own destiny in her own way and she should be legally and administratively empowered to do so. The first step to that end should be an act of Congress limiting the power of the legislature to legislate on Manila local affairs. Such an act of Congress would correspond in purpose to the provision of practically all of our state constitutions guaranteeing home rule to the cities. A thoroughly enlightened attitude on the part of the legislature would be the ideal means of securing home rule for Manila, as the difficulties in precisely defining by statute the subjects related to city government, on which the legislature may act, are almost insuperable. But until the legislature presents indications of a capacity for such an enlightened attitude, no means for securing municipal autonomy, other than a congressional act, seems available. Without such an act one need be neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet to foretell with certainty troublous times for Manila in this respect. Nearly every ambitious young man and woman of the provinces desires a government position in Manila. Every province has a number of legislators to whom the young people appeal. The legislators owe their election to the families of these same ambitious youths. The result will be that Manila will become the football of politics. The temptation to use its power over municipal taxation and expenditures, for political purposes, will prove irresistible to the legislature. Indeed Act No. 2257 is a very decided step in this direction. The limitation of the real estate tax to one and one-half percent is in the interest of the few at the expense of the many, the few having the greater political power. More than one-third of the taxable real estate of Manila is owned by twenty persons or entities. While these twenty property owners enjoy an unreasonably low tax rate the balance of the city's population must endure unpaved streets, unfiltered water, insufficient storm water drainage, congested housing, danger to health and life caused by mosquitoes and rats, to mention only a few respects in which Manila sadly needs urbanization and for which she lacks funds. The proposed act of Congress under consideration should, among other things, provide for the removal of the taxation and debt limits and forbid the legislature to interfere therewith, making the decision of the city government in these matters final upon approval by the Governor-General. Such an arrangement would enable the city to undertake each construction project at the most favorable and economical time and to carry it through as a unit instead of the present costly piecemeal method, as the finances of the city permit. Manila's present indebtedness was incurred for the purpose of constructing a revenue producing utility. The revenue therefrom is sufficient to pay for the operation and maintenance of the utility and to provide for the amortization of the debt. For practical purposes then we may drop that debt from further consideration and we have the amazing spectacle of a city of 270,000 people without debt and needing improvement in a hundred ways, which improvements would be largely for the benefit of future generations, and yet unable to borrow money to make those improvements.

A second step in guaranteeing municipal autonomy should be the granting by the insular legislature to the city of a charter making no attempt to enumerate the powers of the city but granting, instead, all corporate powers not inconsistent with existing laws.

One further matter in connection with the relation of the city to the insular government remains to be considered, viz., the avoidance of duplication of machinery in the governments, e. g., the tax gathering machinery. Shall each government maintain its own tax collector, or shall the insular government act as the agent of the municipal government in this matter or vice versa? The present Manila charter was enacted by the commission soon after it took over the civil government of these Islands. The commission was deeply imbued with a sense of responsibility to the president and the American people for the successful conduct of the government here. It was only natural under these circumstances that the commission should grant only limited powers to the city government, retaining the weight of authority in the insular government of which the commission was the keystone. Thus it was that the city was not entrusted with even a provisional audit of its own expenditures. When a department chief today wishes to purchase ₱5.00 worth of stamps from the Bureau of Posts for his official mail, his voucher must be sent by mail or messenger to the insular auditor for his approval. The result is needless expense, vexation and sometimes costly delays. Similarly the city was not entrusted with the collection of its own taxes, those collections being made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In many cases when a citizen of Manila receives a bill for some service rendered to him by the city he, not being familiar with the anomalous collection machinery, naturally goes to the City Hall to make his payment. There some city employee must consume a considerable portion of his time, for which the city pays, of course, in explaining that collections are made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and that he must go there to make his payment. The city employee must then expend a further considerable portion of his time listening with as much patience as he can summon, to the well founded criticisms of the citizen on the machinery of the city government for collecting its taxes. Or take the case of the man who has learned by bitter experience that he must pay at the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He very frequently questions his bill. In order to clear the matter up he must first go to the city hall. When the bill has been explained to him or a corrected bill rendered, he is subjected to the inconvenience of going to a distant part of the city to make his payment. Another anomalous result of the present arrangement is that while the city pays annually to the Bureau of Internal Revenue a considerable sum for the collection of the city taxes, each case of collection through the courts must be handled by the city attorney. In other words, the Internal Revenue Bureau receives such taxes as are paid without protest and without the intervention of any other collection agency than tellers to count the amounts received and issue receipts therefor,

while the troublesome cases are turned over to the city attorney. Thus the city pays for the collection of its taxes and a city official does a large share of the work.

Similarly the commission refused to trust the city to guard the health of its inhabitants, that duty being entrusted to the Insular Bureau of Health. The wisdom of these provisions at the time they were enacted, considering the peculiar conditions prevailing at that time, is not questioned. It is believed, however, that the decentralization policy now being enforced in the provinces and smaller municipalities should logically have begun in Manila several years ago. The city government of Manila should be made to conform in this respect to the best municipal practice in other parts of the world, i. e., where the insular and city governments have the same function to perform within the same territorial limits, the city government should act as the agent for the insular government, for the city of Manila, then, should provide the machinery for the taking over by the city, not only of the administration of all such purely local matters as the public health, tax collection and the auditing of expenditures, but the agency for the insular government in all matters in which such agency can be exercised with advantage to both governments.

A second principle of city government, also firmly established by the experience of American and English cities, is that responsibility must be fixed. The American theory of national government is based on the principle of checks and balances. The fathers of the constitution had constantly in mind the struggles of the English commons for civil rights and personal liberty. They feared to endow the executive of the new nation with any considerable powers and consequent responsibility, lest he develop into a monarchial tyrant. Therefore the legislature was set to watch and check the executive. Likewise, they feared that the legislature would develop into an oligarchy to the destruction of popular rights. Hence the executive was given the veto power and the supreme court was given authority to pass upon the constitutionality of congressional acts. The result is a piece of governmental mechanism of great complexity and diversification of powers and responsibility. Neither the executive nor the legislature nor the judiciary is responsible for the conduct of the national government. The machine has worked with measurable success only because of the genius of the American people for local self-government and because of the immense natural resources of the country and in spite of the defects of the machinery. The national government has been immensely extravagant and uneconomical. The problem of succeeding congresses has been to get rid of the surplus in the national treasury rather than to raise sufficient revenue to maintain the government and to develop the resources of the country. Now that the natural resources of the country have practically all been opened to development the only hope for the future would seem to be the election of executives who by the force of their personalities may become actual heads of the nation instead of mere figure heads as is the powerful tendency under our form of government.

Up to within recent years the American city was considered to be primarily a subdivision of the state, and city government was therefore based on the same theory of checks and balances with its resulting lack of fixed responsibility. Sight was lost of the fact that the civil and political rights of the citizen are not a concern of the city government and that hence the theory of checks and balances is not applicable to city government. No account was taken of the fact that the great bulk of the duties of the city government are of an administrative character and that therefore the form of city government should be such as to facilitate positive action. In short, the form of city government was ill adapted to its function. The result was the Tweed ring of New York and the gas trust of Philadelphia, and the justification of Mr. Bryce's judgment that "That adaptability of the institutions to the people and their conditions, which judicious strangers have been wont to admire in the United States * * * * is wholly absent as regards municipal administration." Happily the era of municipal government to which he referred is rapidly passing and the principle of fixed responsibility is generally recognized to be one of the foundation stones of good government for the cities.

A third generally recognized principle of good city government, viz., that of expert administrative personnel is fairly well established in the present Manila government thru the fact that administrative officials are appointed for unlimited terms instead of elected and that those appointments are made under civil service regulations. The chief defect of the present arrangement lies in the fact that a number of very important appointments are made by a board composed of six men, thus violating the principle of fixed responsibility.

A thoroughly modern city government should be so framed as to encourage the development of civic virtue and intelligence among its citizens and to enable the city to take full advantage for its own benefit of such civic virtue and alertness as exist at any time. The government of English cities is so framed as to secure for the cities the services of men of wealth, broad culture and wide vision. Not only are such services secured gratis but these men are expected to give and they do give from their private purses large sums for charitable and social uplift purposes. A sufficient motive for such generosity seems to lie in the honor which in England attaches to municipal service and in the wide field for real accomplishment in the way of social service which municipal government work offers. The present government of Manila offers no opportunities of this kind. The elective members of the municipal board are well paid for their time and effort. Indeed, membership on the municipal board, in view of the limited powers of that board and its consequent subservience to the insular government, is of such doubtful honor that the position must of necessity carry a reasonable salary in order to bring out candidates of even a mediocre type. Although such a salary is paid, one needs only a slight acquaintance with events of recent years to become convinced that an elective municipal board membership has become merely a stepping stone to preferment in insular politics. During municipal election campaigns municipal policies and administrative problems are scarcely mentioned.

The suffrage of the voters is solicited on grounds of insular political party expediency. The form of government for Manila which we are developing will, then, be such as to waken a popular interest in municipal problems and policies and enable the city to utilize for its own benefit such interest on the part of individual citizens.

A last principle of municipal government generally recognized in Europe and generally disregarded in America, is the separation of the money appropriating and money spending powers. When the money spending officials are of sufficiently high character and breadth of vision, they may safely be entrusted with the appropriating power also. Practically such a combination of powers frequently leads to personal jealousies and log rolling. There would seem to be no sufficient reason for exposing our proposed government to the dangers inherent in such a defective mechanism, so we will separate the money appropriating from the money spending power.

We have now determined the general method of treatment of our subject and have fixed the relation of the form of city government to the actual quality of that government. We have determined the nature of the problems of city government and have discussed the origin and bearing of certain well established principles of municipal government. We may now proceed to the collection, restatement and application of those principles.

They are

1. Municipal autonomy and freedom from interference in local matters on the part of the state legislature.
2. Fixed responsibility on the part of administrative officials.
3. Expert personnel.
4. Development and utilization of the civic virtue and intelligence of the people.
5. Separation of the money appropriating power from the money spending power.

The form of government based on these principles should have for its legal foundation first, an act of congress granting autonomy to the Manila government and guaranteeing that government from the interference of the insular legislature in local matters, and second, a charter granted by the insular legislature, the essential feature of which should be the granting to the municipal corporation of all corporate powers not inconsistent with existing law. The Alcalde should be appointed and removable by the Governor-General as he is at present. He should be responsible to the Governor-General for the good government of the city of Manila. The government should perform its functions through four administrative departments, viz., Public Affairs, Accounts and Finances, Public Safety, and Engineering and Public Works. The number and designation of these departments should be fixed by the charter, thus removing the temptation to squeeze out an unpopular tho efficient official by the abolition of his department. The heads of these depart-

ments should be appointed by the Alcalde, subject to civil service regulations, and should be responsible to him for the good conduct of their respective departments. They should be removable, not by the Alcalde, but upon his recommendation, by the Governor-General, thus securing, not only the principle of fixed responsibility but encouraging care on the part of the Alcalde in making his appointments and discouraging the discharge of efficient men for personal reasons. These department heads, together with three elective members, should constitute the municipal board, which board should be charged with the duty and responsibility for corporate acts. The work of the city should be apportioned among the different departments by the board in accordance with the purpose of those departments as indicated by their designations and according to the best judgment of the board. The work of each department should be done through as many divisions as might appear most advantageous to the department head. Each elective member should be a resident of one of three particular sections comprising the entire city but should be elected by the suffrage of the city as a whole. Thus no section of the city would feel unrepresented and the elective members, being chosen by the voters of the entire city, would be encouraged to take a broad rather than a sectional view of the problems presented for their solution.

The Alcalde should not be a member of the municipal board. The department heads, being his appointees, would not be sufficiently independent and the result of the board's deliberations would not represent the best thought of all. It should be the Alcalde's right to attend and present his views at any board meeting and it should be his duty to so attend when requested to do so by the board. The Alcalde, as head of the municipal government, should be freed from the necessity of devoting his time and energies to the details of city government. He should have the time and other facilities for studying those larger problems and policies involving the physical, moral and social well-being of the individual citizen which is the ultimate *raison d'etre* of the city government. The prestige of his position and the judicious use of his appointing power would enable him to mould and guide the destiny of the city without any additional power which a board membership might confer upon him. The power of the Alcalde should be strengthened by conferring upon him a limited veto power. Every legislative act of the board should be presented to him for approval. In case of the overruling of his veto by a vote of five or more against the balance of the board, the decision should lie with the Governor-General.

We come now to the mechanism for separating the money appropriating from the money spending power. A board of estimates should be created by the charter to consist of the Alcalde and other members to serve without pay and to be appointed by the Governor-General. No expenditure of municipal funds should be lawful without the prior approval of this board. The Governor-General would of course appoint to this board, far-seeing men with permanent interest in the city and with sufficient leisure to enable them to give thorough study to the financial needs and problems of the city. By thus granting large powers to a board composed chiefly

of unpaid private citizens and opening to them a wide field for the accomplishment of important and far reaching results, the position would become one of honor, the interest of the public would be aroused and the city would secure gratis the valuable services of its leading men.

As an additional means of awakening civic interest and intelligence and of bringing the city government into conformity with the spirit and desires of the people, the charter should provide for the holding of a popular convention every three years for the revision of the municipal ordinances. The recommendations of this convention should become law immediately upon the approval of the Governor-General who should be free to approve or disapprove the recommendations of the convention as a whole or to approve them in part, rejecting the balance. Similarly the charter should provide for a charter revision convention to be held every five years, its recommendations to become law in the same way.

PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL

Published monthly, August to April, inclusive, during the academic year by the alumni and students of the College of Law, University of the Philippines.

Subscription ₱4.00 and 5.00 per annum. Single Numbers .75. Supplement .60

MANAGING EDITOR,
Alexander Reyes, 1914 Law.

BUSINESS MANAGER,
Manuel Tabora, Junior.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Serafin P. Hilado, 1913 Law	-----	Alumni
Pedro Y. Ylagan, Junior	-----	College News
Conrado Benitez, Senior	-----	Note and Comment

FACULTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

George A. Malcolm, Dean of the College of Law.
Clyde A. DeWitt, Professorial Lecturer on Corporations.
José Abreu, Professorial Lecturer on Trial Practice.

SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN

NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON BAR EXAMINATION IRREGULARITIES

Reading the news items that appear in the Manila dailies from time to time, perhaps one unacquainted with the Philippines would get the impression that the ideal of lawyers, and especially of the candidates for the bar, is way below par. Accounts of attempts to buy the examination questions, and of sales of faked ones to eager candidates frequently appear in print. These, added to what one hears almost everywhere in the city concerning different "campaign funds" amounting to many thousands of pesos, ready to be paid to the person who, by hook or crook, could "deliver the goods" a few hours before the time set for the examination, lend a certain glamor to such an event and dim the real issues involved. It is, indeed, strange that so far no organized public movement has been started to rouse the ire of public consciousness against reported irregularities. Lawyers throughout the civilized world are the direct supports of justice; lawyers in the Philippines hold a similar place. Why not bring public and private pressure to bear against the immoral practice of trying to get through the bar examination by means of bribery and fraud? Why idly sit by and acquiesce in a state of affairs which, if longer permitted, would bring dishonor, not alone to an old and honored profession, but also to the good name of the country as a whole and its people?

The Supreme Court has already taken the first step in the movement to stamp out bribery in the examination, by the enforcement of strict regulations. But that is not enough. Public conscience must be so aroused that it will not tolerate bribery and fraud. After all, the social values in a community are what, in the long run, determine whether any practice shall survive or not.