The Promise and Tragedy of the Philippine Party-List System

With the 2025 midterm elections afoot, the perceived failings of the party-list system have once again been the subject of public scrutiny. A recent report by election watchdog Kontra Daya detailed how over half of the registered party-lists for the upcoming polls do not represent any marginalized sector but are instead controlled by mainstream politicians, big businesses, or military groups.^[1] However, even as the Constitution itself mandates that twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives must come from party-lists,^[2] whether they should be avenues for the representation of marginalized sectors is not as clear-cut as it might seem. Over the years, and through changing jurisprudence, this has been a subject of academic debate among scholars of political and election law.

The party-list system was never intended to strictly revolve around representation of marginalized sectors. This was the crux of Ibarra M. Gutierrez III’s argument in The Judicially Legislated Concept of Marginalization and the Death of Proportional Representation: The Party-List System after BANAT and Ang Bagong Bayani,^[3] published in the Philippine Law Journal in 2010. Gutierrez explored the history of the party-list system as a means for smaller parties—including, but not only, parties representing marginalized sectors—to secure representation in Congress by allocating a certain number of seats based on their share of the popular vote.

Gutierrez noted from the Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission the colorful debate between advocates of both “open” and “closed” iterations of the party-list system. Champions of the “open” system envisioned party-lists as a means for political parties to secure seats in Congress even when they are unable to win in local, first-past-the-post district races.^[4] Simply put, it was meant to set aside congressional seats for proportional representation. On the other hand, advocates of the “closed” party-list system wanted to reserve these seats, or at least half of them, for marginalized sectors. The “open” system prevailed, with an innovation inserted as a compromise: for three election cycles, half of the seats would be reserved for sectors including “labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors”^[5] to give these groups the opportunity to develop their respective movements into national parties able to contest for seats in the party-list.

This was Gutierrez’s justification for bemoaning the Supreme Court’s rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec^[6] and Banat v. Comelec,^[7] which effectively required participants in the party-list elections to come from marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Republic Act No. 7941, the enabling law for the party-list system.^[8] To Gutierrez, these rulings “radically alter[ed]”^[9] the Framers’ intention by “resurrect[ing] the idea of perpetual marginalized representation.”^[10] By reserving party-list seats to sectoral representation, sectoral parties are given what Gutierrez called a “kid’s table” and a “built-in disincentive” to grow and broaden their movements and contest power in other electoral arenas,^[11] producing the opposite of representation.

In 2013, however, the Supreme Court reversed course through Atong Paglaum v. Comelec,^[12] where it removed the limitation of party-lists needing to originate from marginalized and underrepresented groups and removed the need for participating political parties to have “well-defined political constituencies.” Atong Paglaum effectively reinstated the “open” system, albeit more extremely by literally opening it for every group, party, or movement able to register as a party-list.

Paolo de Guzman’s article Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections: A Shift in the Party-List System Paradigm,^[13] published in the Ateneo Law Journal, foretold how this “paradigm shift” by the Court would result in better organized and funded political parties dominating the party-list system, especially as the case failed to delineate specifically as to what constitutes “major political parties.” De Guzman likewise criticized the Atong Paglaum ruling, which is largely anchored on the legislative history of the party-list system, for being illustrative of the Court’s cherry-picking to justify such a shift in paradigm.

Advocates for a reinspection of the party-list system argue from minor tweaks to total abolition, although the latter view may be more disingenuous. Former President Rodrigo Duterte, for example, sided with the latter by red-tagging representatives of progressive party-list groups.^[14] Regardless of the diversity of voices in this debate, there is little to no traction to party-list reform.^[15] A bill seeking to amend RA 7941 has not moved,^[16] even when it is the Commission on Elections itself which called for urgent changes.^[17]

And why would Congress initiate reform? The Supreme Court itself already allowed the system to be hijacked by their interests, with party-list seats now occupied by dynasts who use the system to galvanize their hold over bailiwicks and augment their own representation. In the most recent elections in 2022,^[18] only one of the top five parties which won seats in the party-list system arguably represented a “marginalized” sector as recognized in the Constitution.^[19] Two of the parties were regional parties, whereas those sectors recognized in the Constitution to be marginalized, only one party, representing the youth, was within the top twenty.^[20]

This is, perhaps, the most telling of the “tragedy” of the party-list system. As Gutierrez argued, it was envisioned both as a way to institutionalize proportional representation and incentivize marginalized sectors to contest congressional power. But what was largely forgotten there was how entrenched dynastic and corporate interests are in politics. Three election cycles of guaranteed representation for marginalized sectors were perhaps never going to be enough. And then, even when it was clear that that constitutional vision was largely failing, Atong Paglaum removed all guardrails and sent the system into overdrive. Now, voters are left with confusion when they were promised representation.

Other scholarly views likewise present interesting points of reflection. In Defining the Undefinable: Treating Atheism, Agnosticism, and Secular Humanism as Religion for Conscientious Objection, Tax Exemption, and Party-List Registration Purposes,^[21] for example, Carlos S. Hernandez, Jr. looks at the legal questions surrounding the concept of religion in the party-list system. He argued for the treatment of atheist, agnostic, and secular humanist organizations as groups which may be represented by party-lists, even when the Constitution excludes the “religious sector” from marginalized groups.^[22] The question of what kind of party-lists may be registered is foundational to understanding the legal issues surrounding the system, but as Hernandez Jr.’s arguments show, even this most basic question is yet to have a definitive answer.

On Monday, May 12, the almost seventy million voting population of the country will once again head to the polls and select their leaders, both local and national, including their party-lists of choice. The issues of our time demand that our exercise of this right be taken with utmost regard for the Republic and its institutions. But when one of such institutions—enshrined precisely so the interests of the people are heard beyond the ballot—has been exposed by supervening legal and political developments as a tragic failure, the call for participation and vigilance both by scholars and the public alike must be heeded, even after they leave their polling precincts.

This In Retrospect was prepared by PLJ Interns John Paolo Cabrera, Aaron Reiel Chan, Isaiah Tyler Mendoza, Grant Henry Panganiban, with substantial contributions from Vice Chair Iñaqui Mangahas.

In Retrospect is a series of thought pieces revisiting past Journal articles in light of recent developments in current affairs or related literature. They are written by PLJ interns, with guidance from the Editorial Board.

^[1] Jerome Aning, Kontra Daya: Over half of party lists don’t represent poor, Inquirer.net, Feb. 23, 2025, available at https://www.inquirer.net/428606/kontra-daya-over-half-of-party-lists-dont-represent-poor/.

^[2] Const. art. VI, § 5(2).

^[3] Ibarra M. Gutierrez, III, The Judicially Legislated Concept of Marginalization and the Death of Proportional Representation: The Party-List System after BANAT and Ang Bagong Bayani [hereinafter “Gutierrez”] 84 Phil. L.J. 606 (2010).

^[4] Id. at 611.

^[5] Const. art. VI, § 5(2).

^[6] 412 Phil. 308 (2001).

^[7] 604 Phil. 131 (2009).

^[8] Gutierrez, supra note 3, at 618.

^[9] Id.

^[10] Id.

^[11] Id. at 627.

^[12] 707 Phil. 454 (2013).

^[13] Paolo de Guzman, Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections: A Shift in the Party-List System Paradigm, 58 Ateneo L.J. 208 (2013).

^[14] Alexis Romero, Duterte calls for the abolition of party-list system, PhilStar.com, May 12, 2022, at https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/05/12/2180666/duterte-calls-abolition-party-list-system.

^[15] Wilnard Barcelonia, Senators revive push to reform party-list system., Phil. News Agency, Aug. 7, 2023, at https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1207302/.

^[16] S. No. 179, 19th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (2022).

^[17] Llanesca T. Panti, Comelec urges changes to party-list law as political families find their way into system,GMA News, Apr. 3, 2024, at https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/902536/comelec-urges-changes-to-party-list- law-as-political-families-find-their-way-into-system/story/.

^[18] Party List Summary Statement of Votes by Region (By Rank), Comelec Website, at https://comelec.gov.ph/?r=2022NLE/ElectionResults_/PartyListSummaryStatementofVotes.

^[19] Know Your Candidates: 4Ps Party-list, People’s Television, Apr. 30, 2025, at https://ptvnews.ph/know-your-candidates-4ps-party-list/.

^[20] Comelec, supra note 18.

^[21] Carlos S. Hernandez, Jr. In Defining the Undefinable: Treating Atheism, Agnosticism, and Secular Humanism as Religion for Conscientious Objection, Tax Exemption, and Party-List Registration Purposes, 91 Phil. L.J. 1 (2018).

^[22] Id. at 58-77.